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Security audit

数据管道工具箱

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only ETL skill whose network and database examples are expected for its stated data-pipeline purpose, with no bundled executable or hidden persistence found.

Before using this skill with real data, confirm every API, database, warehouse, storage bucket, and webhook destination is approved; use least-privilege credentials from environment variables or a secret manager, avoid exposing secrets in command history, and apply masking or minimization for PII or business-sensitive data.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly guides users to move data between APIs, databases, cloud storage, queues, and webhooks, but it does not warn about handling sensitive data, credential exposure, or the risk of unintentionally exfiltrating production data. In an ETL context, these omissions are significant because users commonly process PII, business data, and secrets, and the examples normalize broad data movement without any security guardrails.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

md
./pipeline.sh create my-pipeline

# 添加数据源
./pipeline.sh extract my-pipeline api --url https://api.example.com/data

# 添加转换规则
./pipeline.sh transform my-pipeline filter "status == 'active'"

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The examples use connection strings and webhook/API URLs in command lines without any caution about shell history leakage, secret management, or the security implications of sending data over the network. This can lead users to pass live credentials and sensitive destinations directly in commands, increasing the risk of credential disclosure and accidental transmission to untrusted endpoints.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.