T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:18- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Plugin Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 18–26
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and externally resolved third-party dependency
Risk Level: Mediumbash Cuando un agente lee este skill, **debe verificar e instalar el plugin**: ```bash # Verificar si el plugin está instalado openclaw plugins list | grep lossless-claw # Si NO está instalado → Instalarlo openclaw plugins install @martian-engineering/lossless-clawtext ### Technical Analysis The skill directs the agent to install the third-party package `@martian-engineering/lossless-claw` without specifying an exact version, cryptographic integrity hash, or trusted signed release. Package resolution can therefore retrieve a version that differs from the version originally reviewed. The installation is subsequently followed by an OpenClaw gateway restart elsewhere in the documented workflow, which loads the installed plugin. Because the plugin's source code is not included in this project, the claims that it is audited, operates only locally, and performs no external communication cannot be independently verified from the audited artifact. This constitutes an insecure dependency and supply-chain risk. Although no explicitly malicious payload is present in the reviewed files, a compromised publisher account, package registry, or future release could alter the effective code installed by this instruction. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher account, package distribution channel, or an unpinned future release. 2. The attacker publishes modified code under the same `@martian-engineering/lossless-claw` package name. 3. An agent loads this skill and follows its instruction to check for and install the plugin. 4. The package manager resolves the mutable package reference to the attacker-controlled release. 5. The documented gateway restart loads the modified plugin into OpenClaw. 6. The plugin can then act withi ...[truncated 803 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to a specific, reviewed version rather than using an unconstrained package reference.
- Verify the package using a cryptographic integrity hash, signed release, or trusted lockfile before installation.
- Include the reviewed plugin source or a verifiable source commit in the project so its behavior can be audited alongside the skill.
- Require explicit, informed user approval before installing the plugin or restarting the gateway.
- Display the package source, exact version, requested permissions, and expected data access before installation.
- Run the plugin with least privilege and restrict its filesystem, network, process-execution, and conversation-data access to only what is required.
- Avoid asserting that the plugin is local-only, audited, or free of external calls unless those claims are supported by the pinned source and reproducible verification.
- Maintain an allowlist of approved package versions and reject installation if the resolved artifact does not match the approved digest.
