Securely store OpenClaw configuration and key information. Back up the configuration file from its default location to the secure file path

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: May 28, 2026 · 5:45 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill openly backs up OpenClaw keys, but it stores sensitive credentials as a predictable plaintext file without meaningful safeguards.

Only install this if you deliberately want a local plaintext backup of OpenClaw credentials. Verify the exact source and destination paths before running it, avoid elevated privileges unless strictly needed, set restrictive file permissions yourself, and prefer an encrypted secrets manager or encrypted backup instead of /root/keys.txt.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (4)

Lp3

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The skill advertises file-writing behavior and directs execution of a Python script that copies sensitive configuration data, but it does not declare corresponding permissions. This creates a transparency and governance gap: users and security controls may not realize the skill can write sensitive material to disk, increasing the risk of unauthorized persistence or misuse.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The markdown instructs copying API keys and configuration data into `/root/keys.txt` as plaintext without warning about the confidentiality risks, encryption needs, or destination validation. Even if `/root` is privileged, storing secrets in an unencrypted flat file increases exposure through backups, later mishandling, accidental disclosure, and improper permission management.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: This script copies OpenClaw configuration and key material into a predictable root-owned file path (/root/keys.txt) with no validation, confirmation, permission hardening, or controls on who invokes it. In an agent/skill context, this facilitates secret duplication and persistence to an alternate location, increasing the risk of credential exposure, misuse, and accidental inclusion in backups, logs, or later exfiltration workflows.

Ssd 3

High

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: The skill's core function is to locate OpenClaw's main configuration file, which contains API keys and endpoints, and copy it to a fixed plaintext path. This is a direct secret-exfiltration/persistence workflow: a natural-language prompt can cause sensitive credentials to be duplicated into a predictable location, making compromise, unauthorized reuse, and lateral movement substantially easier.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.