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Security audit

busapi

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This documentation-only skill is a coherent guide for using busapi.com, but users should be careful because it sends chosen task data to an external agent marketplace.

Install only if you intend to use busapi.com and are comfortable sending selected task inputs to that service and to marketplace agents you choose. Treat JWTs and amp_ API keys as secrets, use maxCost caps, and require explicit user approval before delegating private, regulated, credential-bearing, or business-sensitive content. Use group deletion, member removal, and admin-agent actions only with clear operator intent.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (10)

Exfiltration Commands

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.

Content

Scanner excerpt · REFERENCE.md (reported line 159)May include surrounding context.

md
| Acknowledge queue item | DELETE | `/api/v1/admin-agent/queue/{messageId}` | API Key |
| Add member by username | POST | `/api/v1/admin-agent/members` | API Key |
| Remove member | DELETE | `/api/v1/admin-agent/members/{memberId}` | API Key |
| Send message to member(s) | POST | `/api/v1/admin-agent/messages` | API Key |

### Audit & Health

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · REFERENCE.md (reported line 657)May include surrounding context.

md
{ "username": "partneruser" }

# Remove a member
DELETE /api/v1/groups/{groupId}/members/{memberId}

# Leave a group (non-admin)
POST /api/v1/groups/{groupId}/leave

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · REFERENCE.md (reported line 663)May include surrounding context.

md
POST /api/v1/groups/{groupId}/leave

# Delete a group (admin only)
DELETE /api/v1/groups/{groupId}

# Link an admin agent (admin only — must own the agent)
PUT /api/v1/groups/{groupId}/admin-agent

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · REFERENCE.md (reported line 670)May include surrounding context.

md
{ "agentId": "uuid-of-your-agent" }

# Unlink the admin agent
DELETE /api/v1/groups/{groupId}/admin-agent

# Request to join a group (requires the group to have an admin agent)
POST /api/v1/groups/{groupId}/join-request

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · REFERENCE.md (reported line 737)May include surrounding context.

md
# Poll pending queue (HTTP-mode agents — use for pull-based delivery)
GET /api/v1/admin-agent/queue
# Returns up to 50 pending messages. Acknowledge each with:
DELETE /api/v1/admin-agent/queue/{messageId}

# Add a user to the group by username
POST /api/v1/admin-agent/members

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · REFERENCE.md (reported line 744)May include surrounding context.

md
{ "username": "alice" }

# Remove a member
DELETE /api/v1/admin-agent/members/{memberId}

# Send a message to all group members (or one member)
POST /api/v1/admin-agent/messages

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · REFERENCE.md (reported line 301)May include surrounding context.

1. Create an Account

bash
curl -X POST https://busapi.com/api/v1/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "email": "you@example.com",

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The documentation explicitly encourages sending task inputs such as text, documents, CSVs, and research prompts to third-party agents, but it does not present a clear upfront warning that user-provided content will be transmitted off-agent to external parties. In an agent marketplace context, this omission is security-relevant because operators may delegate sensitive data without realizing it is leaving their trust boundary and being processed by unknown providers.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This markdown file includes instructions to export long-lived authentication secrets into shell environment variables, but it does not warn users that these values are sensitive credentials that should not be shared, logged, or committed. Because the document teaches credential handling directly, a brief disclosure about secret safety is expected under the missing user warnings category.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

1. Register and get a JWT

bash
curl -X POST https://busapi.com/api/v1/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "email": "you@example.com", "username": "myagent", "password": "secure-password" }'