T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
index.js:43- Finding
Webhook credentials are exposed through logs and returned objects
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill does what it claims, but it can expose sensitive webhook credentials and can be pointed at arbitrary URLs from the host running it.
Review before installing. Use only in a trusted, single-user context unless the webhook handling is fixed. Do not put real WeCom webhook URLs into this version if logs or command outputs are visible to others, and restrict or remove caller-supplied webhook URLs so the skill cannot be used as a general network request proxy. Pin dependencies and rotate any webhook that may already have appeared in logs.
index.js:43Webhook credentials are exposed through logs and returned objects
index.js:213Unrestricted webhook URLs enable server-side request forgery
The primary purpose matches the description: this is a WeChat Work/WeCom notification sender. However, the declared permissions are empty, while the code performs outbound HTTP POST requests to provided or configured webhook URLs using axios. That network capability is material and should be declared. In addition, the skill exposes extra operational capabilities beyond simple notification sending: a test command that sends a live test notification and a config command that returns configuration details. These are related to the skill but are not reflected in the description. No evidence of unrelated data exfiltration or a materially different purpose was found.
Initialization logging serializes and prints the entire runtime configuration, which includes the defaultWebhook secret. Logs are commonly accessible to operators, support tooling, or aggregated log platforms, so this creates a durable secret leak that can enable unauthorized message sending if the webhook is recovered.
The skill logs the full default webhook URL without warning or redaction, exposing a credential-like secret in plaintext. In the context of a notification skill, the webhook is the primary authorization mechanism, so leaking it directly undermines access control to the downstream WeCom group bot.
The config command returns the full this.config object, which includes defaultWebhook in plaintext. A WeCom webhook URL is effectively a secret because anyone who obtains it can send arbitrary messages to the target group, so exposing it through an operational command is an unnecessary secret-disclosure path for this skill.
The dependency is specified with a caret range (^1.6.0), which allows different installed versions over time instead of a fully fixed release. This weakens supply-chain reproducibility and can silently introduce vulnerable or behavior-changing versions during installation, especially in a notification skill that makes outbound network requests.
}
},
"dependencies": {
"axios": "^1.6.0"
},
"engines": {
"node": ">=16.0.0"
The manifest depends on axios without an exact pinned version, and axios has a history of advisories including SSRF- and proxy-related issues. Because this skill sends notifications via outbound HTTP requests, any affected axios release could be security-relevant in this context, and the non-pinned range makes it impossible to verify from the manifest alone whether deployments are safe.