Back to skill

Security audit

Ticketmax

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent receipt-printer integration with expected physical output behavior, plus supply-chain and confirmation cautions users should understand.

Install only if you trust the ticketmax Go package and are comfortable with it sending output to a configured printer. Pin a reviewed version instead of @latest when possible, confirm PRINTER_ADDR or -addr before printing, and review any Markdown from agents or external tools because cut and buzzer markup can cause real-world paper and noise effects.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:10
Finding

Unpinned Remote Dependency Installation Using a Mutable Version

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:10-17; README.md:8-12
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party executable dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

SKILL.md:10-17:

yaml
install:
  - kind: go
    package: github.com/yatesdr/ticketmax@latest
    bins:
      - ticketmax

README.md:8-12:

bash
# Install
go install github.com/yatesdr/ticketmax@latest

Technical Analysis

The installation instructions retrieve, compile, and install executable Go code from the mutable latest version of an external GitHub repository. The referenced repository matches the project homepage, and the audited files contain no evidence that the current upstream package is malicious. However, the installed implementation is not included in this artifact and is not pinned to a reviewed release or immutable commit.

Consequently, the code executed during a future installation can differ from the code that existed when this Skill was audited. Compromise of the upstream repository, maintainer account, release process, or relevant dependency chain could cause users and agents following these instructions to install altered executable code without an additional review boundary.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the upstream repository, a maintainer account, its release pipeline, or another component affecting the version resolved by @latest.
  2. The attacker publishes or makes available a modified version of github.com/yatesdr/ticketmax.
  3. A user or agent installs the dependency through the Skill installer or executes the documented go install github.com/yatesdr/ticketmax@latest command.
  4. The Go toolchain resolves the mutable version and builds the attacker-controlled source.
  5. The resulting ticketmax binary executes with the privileges of the installing or invoking user when it is run.

This exploitation path requires compromise or malicious modification of ...[truncated 1040 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace @latest with a reviewed, explicit semantic version, for example:

    yaml
    install:
      - kind: go
        package: github.com/yatesdr/ticketmax@v0.1.3
        bins:
          - ticketmax
    
    bash
    go install github.com/yatesdr/ticketmax@v0.1.3
    
  2. For stronger immutability, pin the dependency to a reviewed commit-derived Go pseudo-version rather than a movable branch or tag.

  3. Keep the version in SKILL.md, README.md, and project metadata synchronized to prevent users from following inconsistent installation paths.

  4. Publish release checksums and signed provenance, and document how users should verify them before executing the binary.

  5. Use protected, signed release tags and a hardened release pipeline with restricted maintainer permissions.

  6. Review upstream source and dependency changes before updating the pinned version.

  7. Run the printer utility as an unprivileged account with access limited to the required documents, device, and printer endpoint.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

md
| `\| A \| B \| C \|` | Three columns |
| `![alt](path)` | Image (PNG, JPEG, GIF) |
| `` ```qr `` | QR code block |
| `<!-- cut -->` | Cut paper |
| `<!-- beep -->` | Buzzer (1 beep) |
| `<!-- beep N -->` | Buzzer (N beeps) |

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

md
| `\| A \| B \| C \|` | Three columns |
| `![alt](path)` | Print image (PNG, JPEG, GIF) |
| `` ```qr `` | QR code block |
| `<!-- cut -->` | Cut paper |
| `<!-- beep -->` | Buzzer (1 beep) |
| `<!-- beep N -->` | Buzzer (N beeps) |

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly encourages agent-driven printing workflows but does not warn that rendering markdown through this tool produces immediate physical output on a connected receipt printer, including actions like cutting paper and triggering the buzzer. In an agent context, this can cause unwanted real-world side effects, wasted consumables, and nuisance behavior if untrusted or automatically generated markdown is printed without operator confirmation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill performs physical device actions including printing, paper cutting, and buzzer activation, but the description and usage guidance do not prominently warn users about these side effects. This can lead to unintended physical actions, wasted paper, noise, or surprise interaction with attached hardware when the skill is invoked on untrusted content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.