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Security audit

AgentPhone

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent for making real phone calls, but it can initiate real-world calls and collect transcripts or recordings without requiring clear confirmation or privacy guidance.

Review before installing. Use this skill only when you want an agent to place real outbound calls on your behalf, and require the agent to confirm the target number, business, objective, and any account-changing request before it calls. Do not submit sensitive private URLs in the website field, and consider consent and recording/transcription rules for the call participants.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill does place real calls and returns transcripts and recordings of third-party conversations, but the user-facing description does not clearly warn about those real-world actions and data collection consequences. This can lead to uninformed use, privacy/legal issues, and accidental transmission of sensitive information to an external service.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## 1) Create a call

```bash
curl -X POST https://agentphone.app/api/v1/calls \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "x-api-key: $AGENTPHONE_API_KEY" \
  -d '{"to_phone_number":"+1{PHONE_NUMBER}","objective":"Ask about their return policy"}'
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
import os, requests
r = requests.post("https://agentphone.app/api/v1/calls",
    headers={"x-api-key": os.environ["AGENTPHONE_API_KEY"]},
    json={"to_phone_number": "+1{PHONE_NUMBER}", "objective": "Ask about their return policy"})
call_id = r.json()["data"]["call_id"]
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```python
import os, requests
r = requests.post("https://agentphone.app/api/v1/calls",
    headers={"x-api-key": os.environ["AGENTPHONE_API_KEY"]},
    json={"to_phone_number": "+1{PHONE_NUMBER}", "objective": "Ask about their return policy"})
call_id = r.json()["data"]["call_id"]
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```

```javascript
const r = await fetch("https://agentphone.app/api/v1/calls", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "x-api-key": process.env.AGENTPHONE_API_KEY, "Content-Type": "application/json" },
  body: JSON.stringify({ to_phone_number: "+1{PHONE_NUMBER}", objective: "Ask about their return policy" }),
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The optional `website` field causes the service to scrape a third-party URL for call context, but the documentation does not clearly warn users that supplied URLs and related page data will be transmitted to the vendor. That creates a transparency and data-handling risk, especially if users provide private or sensitive internal URLs.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.