Back to skill

Security audit

Robotaxi Briefing

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed robotaxi news-briefing workflow with public-source fetching and scoped short-term report storage for delta comparison.

Install only if you want an agent to fetch public robotaxi-sector sources, write brief report files under your OpenClaw memory directory, and clean up old matching robotaxi report files. Review the shell examples if your deployment limits shell execution or requires user approval before local writes.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (6)

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Lines L143-L147 state that for/while loops, variable assignment, pipelines, and multi-line shell scripts are 'absolutely forbidden' for shell safety. However, the earlier mandatory RSS scan section uses a multi-line bash script with a for loop, variable assignment, a curl pipeline, and inline Python, directly contradicting the stated safety guidance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The manifest description broadly says the skill tracks robotaxi intelligence and generates briefings, but it does not specify explicit invocation phrases, scope limits, or exclusion conditions. In a manifest file, this kind of open-ended capability description can create ambiguous activation boundaries for when the skill should or should not be invoked.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill embeds substantial shell scripting and network-fetch logic, including curl pipelines and Python execution, which exceeds the minimum needed for a news briefing workflow and increases the attack surface. Even if intended for data collection, encouraging arbitrary shell-capable execution in a skill creates risk of command misuse, environment interaction, and unsafe extension by downstream agents.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs persistent local writes and deletion of files under a user directory without a clear user-facing warning or consent boundary. This creates risk of unintended state changes, report retention of fetched content, and destructive cleanup behavior that could remove data unexpectedly if path assumptions are wrong or reused unsafely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly persists reports to a shared memory-like path and retains them for 24 hours, creating session persistence that can leak prior-run context, fetched content, or derived intelligence across executions. In multi-tenant or shared-agent settings, this can expose sensitive operational history and creates a foothold for poisoning future delta comparisons using tampered prior files.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 178)May include surrounding context.

Before outputting the report to chat, save it with write:

bash
write ~/.openclaw/workspace-group/memory/robotaxi_report_YYYYMMDD_HHMM.md

Then delete files older than 24h:

bash

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The instruction mandates 'All output in Chinese' as a fixed language policy. This is a natural-language locale restriction that does not offer the user a choice or explain a justified region-specific requirement.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.