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Security audit

Voice Cloning Voiceover · Clone Your Voice

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marked this voiceover skill suspicious because scanners report privacy concerns around publicly accessible voice samples and a mismatch between advertised and implemented features; the scan was partial, so the evidence is incomplete.

The verdict is suspicious, so consider avoiding installation unless you need this workflow and accept the reported privacy and feature-accuracy concerns. Before using it, verify the advertised capabilities and avoid publishing voice samples publicly. The scan inspected all listed components, but its overall status was partial because several references could not be resolved; the evidence is therefore incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (7)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The core API-based voice-generation behavior matches the description, including reference-audio URLs, actor IDs, model selection, speed and tags. Subtitle recognition and result downloads are supporting capabilities consistent with the stated purpose. However, the explicit offline dry-run claim is contradicted by the CLI, and the supplied chunk lacks the advertised multi-step comparison and deliverable-generation workflow. No unrelated data collection or covert execution is evident.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The workflow instructs users to publish voice recordings at publicly accessible URLs without warning about privacy risks.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The workflow repeatedly recommends uploading voice samples to publicly accessible storage without explaining exposure risks or limiting access duration. These recordings can contain sensitive speech and reusable voice characteristics, so unintended access can enable privacy violations and unauthorized voice cloning; authorization to clone a voice does not imply consent to publish its source recording.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unbounded Resource Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/miragea_audio.py (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

python
self.timeout = timeout
        self.opener = urllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirect())

    def request(self, method, path, payload=None, content_type=None, key=None, timeout=None):
        headers = {'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + self.key, 'Accept': 'application/json'}
        if content_type:
            headers['Content-Type'] = content_type

Unbounded Resource Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/miragea_audio.py (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

python
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, ValueError) as exc:
            raise ClientError({'error': {'code': 'request_failed', 'message': 'API request failed; submission outcome may be unknown. Reuse the same idempotency key for the same payload.'}}) from None

    def task(self, task_id, timeout=None):
        return self.request('GET', '/tasks/' + urllib.parse.quote(task_id, safe=''), timeout=timeout)

    def capabilities(self):

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/voiceover.py (reported line 163)May include surrounding context.

python
cmd += [flag, str(p[k])]
    for t in p.get("tags", []):
        cmd += ["--tag=" + t]
    r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
    if r.returncode != 0 or not os.path.exists(out_path):
        sys.stderr.write(r.stdout + r.stderr)
        raise ScriptError("generate failed for: %s... Re-run the same command to resume; the same idempotency key "

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/miragea_audio.py (reported line 203)May include surrounding context.

python
raise ValueError('--reference-text requires --reference-audio-url.')
                payload = {'text': args.text if args.text is not None else args.text_file.read_text(encoding='utf-8')}
                for field in ('actor_id', 'reference_audio_url', 'reference_text', 'model', 'format', 'speed', 'tags', 'language'):
                    value = getattr(args, field)
                    if value is not None:
                        payload[field] = value
                result = client.request('POST', '/audio/generations', json.dumps(payload).encode(), 'application/json', submission_key)