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Security audit

Text to Speech (TTS) · Speech Synthesis

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is marked suspicious because scanners report an audio transcription and upload feature outside its stated text-to-speech purpose; the overall confidence is medium.

Consider avoiding installation unless you need the reported transcription feature and are comfortable with local audio being uploaded for remote processing. The scanners also report a partial analysis with unresolved references, so this verdict is not a complete assurance about the artifact.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (7)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The core TTS functionality matches the description, including submitting text, selecting actors or reference audio, choosing output formats, and passing generation settings. However, the recognize command introduces a distinct audio-to-text capability and local audio upload that the TTS description does not disclose. This is not merely subtitle creation accompanying synthesized speech: it accepts a separate local file and submits it for recognition. Several advertised workflow features are also absent from the supplied chunk. Ordinary API authentication, task polling, and output downloads are supporting implementation details and are not independently treated as mismatches.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unbounded Resource Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/miragea_audio.py (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

python
self.timeout = timeout
        self.opener = urllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirect())

    def request(self, method, path, payload=None, content_type=None, key=None, timeout=None):
        headers = {'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + self.key, 'Accept': 'application/json'}
        if content_type:
            headers['Content-Type'] = content_type

Unbounded Resource Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/miragea_audio.py (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

python
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, ValueError) as exc:
            raise ClientError({'error': {'code': 'request_failed', 'message': 'API request failed; submission outcome may be unknown. Reuse the same idempotency key for the same payload.'}}) from None

    def task(self, task_id, timeout=None):
        return self.request('GET', '/tasks/' + urllib.parse.quote(task_id, safe=''), timeout=timeout)

    def capabilities(self):

The client exposes a standalone audio-transcription capability outside the declared text-to-speech scope.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes synthesizing speech from text and producing subtitles alongside generated narration. However, the recognize command (L160–L162) accepts a local file, uploads its contents to /subtitles/recognitions, and submits an independently priced recognition task. Transcribing user-supplied audio is a separate capability, not a necessary implementation detail of generating speech or timing subtitles from the source text.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/voiceover.py (reported line 163)May include surrounding context.

python
cmd += [flag, str(p[k])]
    for t in p.get("tags", []):
        cmd += ["--tag=" + t]
    r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
    if r.returncode != 0 or not os.path.exists(out_path):
        sys.stderr.write(r.stdout + r.stderr)
        raise ScriptError("generate failed for: %s... Re-run the same command to resume; the same idempotency key "

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/miragea_audio.py (reported line 203)May include surrounding context.

python
raise ValueError('--reference-text requires --reference-audio-url.')
                payload = {'text': args.text if args.text is not None else args.text_file.read_text(encoding='utf-8')}
                for field in ('actor_id', 'reference_audio_url', 'reference_text', 'model', 'format', 'speed', 'tags', 'language'):
                    value = getattr(args, field)
                    if value is not None:
                        payload[field] = value
                result = client.request('POST', '/audio/generations', json.dumps(payload).encode(), 'application/json', submission_key)