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Security audit

Movie Recap Voiceover · Multi-Voice · Subtitles

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The verdict is benign with medium confidence: scanners report speech and subtitle tools aligned with the skill’s purpose, alongside a description mismatch and a few limited code and scope concerns.

The scanners’ verdict is benign, not risk-free, and confidence is medium. Consider whether the advertised workflow gaps matter to you, review the skill’s intended tool scope and API timeout behavior, and remember the scan was partial because some referenced local paths were unresolved.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (6)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The code supports the underlying speech-generation and subtitle tasks, including voice references, speed, and tags, but does not implement the central end-to-end workflow described. These are material functional gaps in the supplied chunk, rather than evidence of malicious behavior. Its network requests, local input reads, subtitle-recognition uploads, and output writes are consistent with the underlying audio/subtitle purpose and are not independently suspicious.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unbounded Resource Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/miragea_audio.py (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

python
self.timeout = timeout
        self.opener = urllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirect())

    def request(self, method, path, payload=None, content_type=None, key=None, timeout=None):
        headers = {'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + self.key, 'Accept': 'application/json'}
        if content_type:
            headers['Content-Type'] = content_type

Unbounded Resource Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/miragea_audio.py (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

python
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, ValueError) as exc:
            raise ClientError({'error': {'code': 'request_failed', 'message': 'API request failed; submission outcome may be unknown. Reuse the same idempotency key for the same payload.'}}) from None

    def task(self, task_id, timeout=None):
        return self.request('GET', '/tasks/' + urllib.parse.quote(task_id, safe=''), timeout=timeout)

    def capabilities(self):

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/voiceover.py (reported line 163)May include surrounding context.

python
cmd += [flag, str(p[k])]
    for t in p.get("tags", []):
        cmd += ["--tag=" + t]
    r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
    if r.returncode != 0 or not os.path.exists(out_path):
        sys.stderr.write(r.stdout + r.stderr)
        raise ScriptError("generate failed for: %s... Re-run the same command to resume; the same idempotency key "

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/miragea_audio.py (reported line 203)May include surrounding context.

python
raise ValueError('--reference-text requires --reference-audio-url.')
                payload = {'text': args.text if args.text is not None else args.text_file.read_text(encoding='utf-8')}
                for field in ('actor_id', 'reference_audio_url', 'reference_text', 'model', 'format', 'speed', 'tags', 'language'):
                    value = getattr(args, field)
                    if value is not None:
                        payload[field] = value
                result = client.request('POST', '/audio/generations', json.dumps(payload).encode(), 'application/json', submission_key)