Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
ClawScan rates this skill benign with medium confidence: the findings appear consistent with its stated podcast voiceover purpose, though some usage and permission details merit attention and coverage is partial.
The verdict is benign, not risk-free. Before installing, consider whether the skill's detected environment, file, network, and shell capabilities fit your needs, whether the lack of a declared tool scope is acceptable, and whether Chinese-only show-note labels or requests without a timeout would affect your use. Skillspector inspected all seven listed components, but analysis is marked partial because some local references could not be resolved; the evidence is therefore incomplete.
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.
self.timeout = timeout
self.opener = urllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirect())
def request(self, method, path, payload=None, content_type=None, key=None, timeout=None):
headers = {'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + self.key, 'Accept': 'application/json'}
if content_type:
headers['Content-Type'] = content_type
Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, ValueError) as exc:
raise ClientError({'error': {'code': 'request_failed', 'message': 'API request failed; submission outcome may be unknown. Reuse the same idempotency key for the same payload.'}}) from None
def task(self, task_id, timeout=None):
return self.request('GET', '/tasks/' + urllib.parse.quote(task_id, safe=''), timeout=timeout)
def capabilities(self):
The generated show notes always use Chinese labels for duration, timeline, and transcript, regardless of the input script's language. No language opt-in or documented locale-specific justification is provided.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
cmd += [flag, str(p[k])]
for t in p.get("tags", []):
cmd += ["--tag=" + t]
r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
if r.returncode != 0 or not os.path.exists(out_path):
sys.stderr.write(r.stdout + r.stderr)
raise ScriptError("generate failed for: %s... Re-run the same command to resume; the same idempotency key "
Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.
raise ValueError('--reference-text requires --reference-audio-url.')
payload = {'text': args.text if args.text is not None else args.text_file.read_text(encoding='utf-8')}
for field in ('actor_id', 'reference_audio_url', 'reference_text', 'model', 'format', 'speed', 'tags', 'language'):
value = getattr(args, field)
if value is not None:
payload[field] = value
result = client.request('POST', '/audio/generations', json.dumps(payload).encode(), 'application/json', submission_key)