T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
README.md:240- Finding
Unverified Remote Script Is Executed Directly in CI
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md:240-243
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: CriticalVulnerable Code
yaml - name: Setup OpenClaw run: | # Install OpenClaw curl -fsSL https://get.openclaw.ai | shTechnical Analysis
The documented CI workflow downloads a mutable script from
https://get.openclaw.aiand passes the response directly to a shell. It does not pin a release, store the script for inspection, verify a cryptographic digest or publisher signature, or otherwise authenticate the exact payload that will execute.HTTPS protects the connection in transit but does not protect against compromise of the remote server, domain, DNS infrastructure, publishing account, or build pipeline. Because the executable content can change after the Skill has been reviewed, the command creates a remote code-execution channel controlled by the external endpoint.
This behavior is not necessary for the Skill's core Git-change analysis. A versioned and cryptographically verified installation mechanism can provide the required tool without executing mutable network content blindly.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the
get.openclaw.aiserver, its deployment pipeline, DNS configuration, or another component capable of changing the response. - The attacker replaces the legitimate installer with a malicious shell payload.
- A user copies the documented workflow, or an existing CI job runs it.
curlretrieves the attacker-controlled response.- The pipe sends the response directly to
shwithout inspection or integrity verification. - The payload executes with the CI runner's privileges and can access resources made available to that job.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation provides arbitrary command execution in the CI runner. Depending on workflow configuration, the payload could read or modify checked-out source code, alter build outputs, tamper with gen ...[truncated 360 chars]
- An attacker compromises the
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the
curl | shpipeline from the documented workflow. - Install an exact, reviewed OpenClaw release from an authenticated official source.
- Download the artifact separately and verify a pinned SHA-256 digest or trusted publisher signature before execution.
- Fail the workflow immediately if verification does not succeed.
- Pin CI actions and installation artifacts to immutable versions or commit digests.
- Apply explicit minimum workflow-token permissions and avoid exposing secrets to jobs triggered by untrusted pull requests.
- Prefer ephemeral, isolated runners; do not run unverified installation logic on persistent or privileged self-hosted runners.
- Remove the
