T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:11
- Finding
- Mutable Third-Party Package Is Downloaded and Executed During Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 11-13 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned remote package execution **Risk Level**: Medium ```bash npx clawhub@latest install openclaw-task-reminder ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation command instructs users to execute the mutable `latest` release of the third-party `clawhub` package through `npx`. If the requested package is not already available locally, `npx` can download it from the configured package registry and execute its code immediately. Because the command uses the `latest` distribution tag rather than an audited, immutable version, the code executed by future installations can differ from the code that was reviewed. The project does not provide a lockfile, package checksum, vendored installer, or other integrity control for this command. This creates a supply-chain trust boundary in which compromise of the package, publisher account, registry resolution, or release process can result in arbitrary code execution. This finding does not establish that the current `clawhub` package is malicious; the vulnerability is the unsafe execution of a mutable and externally controlled package release. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `clawhub` publisher account, package publication pipeline, or another relevant package-distribution component. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version and assigns it to the `latest` distribution tag. 3. A user follows the installation instructions in `SKILL.md`. 4. `npx` resolves `clawhub@latest`, downloads the attacker-controlled release, and executes it. 5. The malicious package runs with the permissions and environment of the user performing the installation. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation permits arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the installing user. Depending on that user's permissions and environment, an attacker could read or modify accessible files, steal cr ...[truncated 399 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions - Replace `clawhub@latest` with a specifically reviewed and pinned version, for example `clawhub@<exact-version>`. - Verify the package's provenance and integrity before execution, using registry-supported signatures, attestations, or a published cryptographic digest where available. - Document the expected package registry and trusted publisher identity to reduce dependency-confusion and registry-substitution risk. - Prefer an installation process backed by a committed lockfile and integrity metadata when feasible. - Review the resolved package and its transitive dependencies before updating the pinned version. - Execute installation with the least-privileged user possible and avoid running it as an administrator or in an environment containing unnecessary secrets. - Consider vendoring a reviewed installer or directing users to inspect downloaded code before execution if reproducible package verification is unavailable.