T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:264- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party SDK Installation Instructions
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 264 and 282
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependencies from public package registries
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash npm install openclaw-sdkbash pip install openclawTechnical Analysis
The documentation instructs users to install third-party packages from public npm and Python package registries without specifying reviewed versions, lockfiles, integrity hashes, or trusted source links. Consequently, the installed package is determined by mutable registry state at installation time rather than by the audited Skill content.
Package installation can execute lifecycle hooks, including npm installation scripts. Installed packages may also execute code when subsequently imported by the documented JavaScript or Python examples. If either package or its publisher account is compromised, ownership changes, or an unsafe release is published, following these instructions could introduce unreviewed code into the user's environment.
The available evidence does not establish that the named packages are currently malicious. The risk arises from unconstrained dependency resolution and insufficient supply-chain verification.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the publisher account or release process for
openclaw-sdkoropenclaw, or otherwise causes a malicious release to become the version selected by the package manager. - The attacker publishes a release containing a malicious installation hook or runtime payload.
- A user follows the instructions in
SKILL.mdand runs the unpinnednpm installorpip installcommand. - The package manager retrieves the attacker-controlled release from the public registry.
- Malicious code executes during installation where applicable, or when the package is imported through the documented SDK example.
- The payload operates with the privileges of the user or automation account performing the installation or runn ...[truncated 639 chars]
- An attacker compromises the publisher account or release process for
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin each dependency to an exact version that has been reviewed, for example:
bash npm install --save-exact openclaw-sdk@REVIEWED_VERSION pip install openclaw==REVIEWED_VERSION - Publish and maintain lockfiles where these dependencies are used, such as
package-lock.jsonor a hash-locked Python requirements file. - For Python, require artifact hashes with
pip install --require-hashes. - For npm, retain lockfile integrity metadata and use
npm ciin automated environments. - Document the packages' official registry pages and source repositories so users can verify publisher identity and provenance.
- Review package contents, transitive dependencies, and npm lifecycle scripts before recommending a release.
- Use automated dependency scanning and monitor publisher ownership, release provenance, and newly disclosed vulnerabilities.
- Perform installation in a least-privileged, isolated environment without production credentials or unnecessary filesystem access.
- Pin each dependency to an exact version that has been reviewed, for example:
