T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:39- Finding
Unpinned Remote Code and Dependency Retrieval Followed by Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 39-42
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned remote payload retrieval and insecure dependency installation
Risk Level: HighComplete Code Snippet:
bash git clone https://github.com/openclaw-skills/ai-intelligent-knowledge-qa cd ai-intelligent-knowledge-qa pip install -r requirements.txt python app.pyTechnical Analysis
The audited package contains only documentation and metadata; it does not include the referenced
app.py,requirements.txt, or the advertised application implementation. The installation instructions clone the current state of an external repository without pinning an immutable commit, release, or cryptographic digest. They then install dependencies from an externally retrieved requirements file and execute the downloaded Python application.This creates a time-of-check/time-of-use supply-chain risk: the code reviewed in this package does not determine the code that users will ultimately run. The external repository's default branch can change after this skill is reviewed. Furthermore, the dependency installation command does not show the use of a lockfile, package hashes, trusted package index restrictions, or integrity verification.
No evidence establishes that the current remote repository or its dependencies are malicious. The vulnerability is the unsafe, mutable retrieval and execution workflow itself.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, an authorized maintainer account, or an upstream dependency selected by
requirements.txt. - The attacker adds malicious code to the repository's default branch or causes dependency resolution to select a malicious package version.
- A user follows the documented installation procedure after the remote content has changed.
git cloneretrieves the attacker-controlled content without checking an approved commit hash or signature.- `pip install - ...[truncated 1052 chars]
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, an authorized maintainer account, or an upstream dependency selected by
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Include the complete application source and dependency manifests in the reviewed skill package so its effective runtime behavior can be audited.
- If external retrieval is unavoidable, pin the repository to a reviewed immutable commit hash rather than cloning the mutable default branch.
- Verify the repository revision using a trusted signature or an independently distributed cryptographic digest before installation or execution.
- Use a fully resolved dependency lockfile with exact versions and cryptographic hashes. Install with hash enforcement, such as
pip install --require-hashes, where supported. - Restrict dependency resolution to explicitly approved package indexes and review all direct and transitive dependencies.
- Separate retrieval, verification, installation, and execution into distinct steps. Abort if any integrity or signature check fails.
- Execute the application in an isolated, least-privilege environment with minimal filesystem access, no unnecessary credentials, and restricted outbound network connectivity.
- Add automated source, dependency, and artifact scanning to the release process, and publish reproducible, versioned releases instead of relying on a mutable branch.
