T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:42- Finding
Mutable External Repository and Unverified Dependencies Are Installed and Executed
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 42-45
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and insecure dependency installation
Risk Level: Highbash git clone https://github.com/openclaw-skills/ai-intelligent-expense-reimbursement cd ai-intelligent-expense-reimbursement pip install -r requirements.txt python app.pyTechnical Analysis
The audited package contains only
SKILL.mdandskill.json; it does not include the application implementation or the referencedrequirements.txt. Instead, the installation instructions direct users to clone a mutable external Git repository, install its unaudited dependencies, and executeapp.py.The repository is not pinned to a reviewed commit, tag digest, or cryptographically verified release. Its effective payload can therefore change after this package has been reviewed. In addition,
pip install -r requirements.txtperforms dependency installation without any visible version lock or integrity-hash verification in the audited artifact. Python package installation may execute package build or installation logic, so code execution can occur during dependency installation as well as whenapp.pyis launched.The provenance is also unclear because
skill.jsonidentifies the author asyang1002378395-cmyk, while the installation URL references theopenclaw-skillsGitHub organization. The artifact provides no explanation or verification of this relationship.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced GitHub repository, gains control of a dependency, or otherwise causes malicious content to be served through the external installation chain.
- The attacker modifies
app.py,requirements.txt, or a dependency installation payload. - A user follows the documented instructions and clones the current, externally controlled repository state.
pip install -r requirements.txtinstalls the modified dependencies and may execute malicious build or installation ...[truncated 1021 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Include the complete application implementation and dependency manifest in the audited Skill package rather than downloading the effective implementation at installation time.
- If external retrieval is unavoidable, pin the repository to a specific reviewed commit SHA and verify the downloaded content against an independently published cryptographic digest or signature.
- Replace unconstrained dependency installation with a fully locked dependency file containing exact versions and integrity hashes, such as a hash-checked requirements file used with
pip install --require-hashes. - Review direct and transitive dependencies for compromised, abandoned, typosquatted, or dependency-confusion-prone packages.
- Publish signed, immutable releases and document the trust relationship between the metadata author and the referenced GitHub organization.
- Run the application in an isolated environment with a dedicated unprivileged account, minimal filesystem and network access, and narrowly scoped financial API credentials.
- Do not expose production reimbursement records or payment credentials until the exact application source and dependency set have undergone security review.
