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Security audit

Ai Intelligent Demand Forecasting

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill describes a demand-forecasting app, but its install steps fetch and run unpinned remote code that was not included in the reviewed artifact.

Review the referenced GitHub repository and dependency list before installing. Prefer a pinned commit or signed release, verify checksums where available, and run it in an isolated virtual environment or container without sensitive credentials exposed. Non-Chinese-speaking users should translate the documentation first so pricing, purpose, and setup steps are clear.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:41
Finding

Unpinned Remote Payload Retrieval and Dependency Execution

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 41-46
Vulnerability Type: Mutable remote code retrieval followed by unsafe dependency installation and application execution
Risk Level: High

Complete Code Snippet:

bash
git clone https://github.com/openclaw-skills/ai-intelligent-demand-forecasting
cd ai-intelligent-demand-forecasting
pip install -r requirements.txt
python app.py

Technical Analysis

The installation instructions clone the default branch of an external Git repository without pinning a reviewed commit, immutable tag, checksum, or signed release. The effective code installed and executed can therefore change after this Skill has been audited.

The instructions subsequently install packages from the remotely retrieved requirements.txt. Python packages may execute code during build or installation, and the document provides no dependency lockfile, package hashes, trusted-index restrictions, or version verification. Finally, the remotely retrieved app.py is executed directly.

The audited package contains only SKILL.md; neither requirements.txt nor app.py is locally available for review. Consequently, the behavior of the downloaded dependencies and application cannot be established from this artifact. This represents both remote payload retrieval and an insecure software supply-chain boundary.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the referenced repository, its owner account, the default branch, or a dependency named in its requirements.txt.
  2. The attacker modifies app.py, dependency declarations, or package installation behavior.
  3. A user follows the documented installation commands, retrieving the current attacker-controlled repository state.
  4. pip install -r requirements.txt may execute malicious package build or installation logic.
  5. python app.py directly executes the downloaded payload.
  6. The payload runs with the permissions and environm ...[truncated 721 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  1. Package the reviewed implementation and dependency manifests directly with the Skill so that the installed code matches the audited artifact.
  2. If remote retrieval is unavoidable, pin the repository to a specific reviewed commit hash rather than cloning a mutable default branch.
  3. Distribute releases with cryptographic checksums or signatures and verify them before installation or execution.
  4. Use a fully resolved dependency lockfile with exact versions and package hashes, such as hash-locked requirements installed with pip --require-hashes.
  5. Restrict package retrieval to explicitly approved indexes and validate package names to reduce dependency-confusion and typosquatting risk.
  6. Review both the application and all dependency installation paths before release.
  7. Perform installation and execution in an isolated virtual environment or container using a non-privileged account, minimal filesystem access, no unnecessary secrets, and restricted network access.
  8. Separate retrieval, verification, installation, and execution into distinct documented steps. Do not execute downloaded code unless integrity and provenance checks succeed.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The description and primary documentation content are presented only in Chinese, and the file does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or provide an opt-in language choice. This can violate language/locale policy expectations when users are not given a choice of language.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.