T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:40- Finding
Unpinned Remote Repository Retrieval and Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 40–43
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: HighComplete Code Snippet:
bash git clone https://github.com/openclaw-skills/ai-intelligent-chatbot-builder cd ai-intelligent-chatbot-builder pip install -r requirements.txt python app.pyTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions clone the current default branch of an external GitHub repository without pinning a reviewed commit or immutable release. They provide no checksum or signature verification before installing its dependencies and executing
app.py.As a result, the code ultimately executed is not contained in the audited artifact and can change after this review. The artifact provides no mechanism for users to verify that the retrieved implementation is the same version that was previously reviewed. This establishes an externally mutable code-execution channel.
The GitHub URL is explicit and uses HTTPS, and the reviewed file contains no evidence that the referenced repository is currently malicious. The finding concerns the insecure trust model and the resulting supply-chain exposure rather than confirmed malicious intent.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, its maintainer account, or the repository's release workflow.
- The attacker modifies the default branch,
requirements.txt, orapp.py. - A user follows the documented installation commands without pinning or verifying the retrieved revision.
pip install -r requirements.txtmay execute attacker-controlled package installation logic.python app.pydirectly executes the attacker-controlled application code.- The payload operates with the permissions and environmental access of the user running these commands.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution with the invoking user's privileges. De ...[truncated 542 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the repository to a specific reviewed commit hash or immutable, signed release rather than cloning the mutable default branch.
- Verify the downloaded source using a trusted cryptographic signature or a checksum distributed through an independent trusted channel.
- Vendor the reviewed implementation into the Skill package when feasible so that the audited and executed content are identical.
- Document the expected repository origin, revision, release signature, and verification procedure.
- Run installation and execution in an isolated environment with restricted filesystem, credential, and network access.
- Avoid running the application as an administrator or root user.
