T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:39- Finding
Mutable Remote Repository Retrieved and Executed Without Integrity Verification
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 39-42
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: MediumComplete Code Snippet:
bash git clone https://github.com/openclaw-skills/ai-intelligent-blockchain-platform cd ai-intelligent-blockchain-platform pip install -r requirements.txt python app.pyTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions direct users to clone a remote Git repository and execute its
app.pyfile. The repository is not pinned to a specific commit hash or cryptographically verified release. The effective executable payload can therefore change after this Skill package has been reviewed.Neither
app.pynor the referenced dependency manifest is included in the audited artifact, which contains onlySKILL.mdandskill.json. The behavior of the remotely retrieved application consequently cannot be established from the reviewed files. Although the documented commands do not themselves prove malicious intent, following them creates an unverified remote-code execution path.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, a maintainer account, or the repository’s distribution process.
- The attacker modifies
app.pyor another imported module in the remote repository. - A user follows the installation instructions and clones the repository without selecting a trusted immutable revision.
- The user runs
python app.py. - The modified remote payload executes with the permissions and environment access of that user.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution under the invoking user’s account. The payload could access files, environment variables, network resources, and credentials available to that account. Because the Skill advertises wallet-management and blockchain functionality, execution in an environment containing wallet credentials or private keys could have ...[truncated 122 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Include the reviewed application source within the Skill package rather than retrieving mutable code during installation.
- If external retrieval is unavoidable, pin the repository to a specific trusted commit hash and verify the downloaded content against a published cryptographic digest.
- Prefer signed releases and verify their signatures before execution.
- Document the expected publisher identity and repository ownership so users can validate provenance.
- Run the application with least privilege in an isolated virtual environment or container.
- Prevent access to wallet secrets, private keys, and unrelated credentials until the retrieved code has been independently reviewed.
