T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:42- Finding
Unpinned Remote Repository and Dependency Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 42–45
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and insecure dependency execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code:
bash git clone https://github.com/openclaw-skills/ai-intelligent-api-management cd ai-intelligent-api-management pip install -r requirements.txt python app.pyTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions direct users to clone a mutable remote Git repository and execute content that is not included in the audited artifact. The repository is not pinned to an immutable commit or signed release. No checksum or signature is provided to verify the downloaded source.
The subsequent
pip install -r requirements.txtcommand installs dependencies from an unavailable and unreviewed requirements file. Python package installation can execute package build or installation logic. Finally,python app.pydirectly runs the remotely obtained application.Consequently, the code ultimately executed by users can change after this skill has been reviewed. Neither the remote application nor its dependencies can be validated from the two files present in the audited project.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, gains control of its publishing account, or causes a malicious dependency to be added to its
requirements.txt. - The attacker modifies the default branch, application, or dependency definitions with malicious code.
- A user follows the documented installation procedure and clones the current default branch.
pip install -r requirements.txtexecutes malicious package installation logic, orpython app.pyexecutes the modified application.- The payload runs with the permissions of the user performing the installation.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary code execution under the invoking user's account. Depending on that account's permissions and a ...[truncated 548 chars]
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, gains control of its publishing account, or causes a malicious dependency to be added to its
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Include the reviewed application source and dependency manifests directly in the skill package so that installed behavior matches the audited artifact.
- If remote retrieval is necessary, pin the repository to an immutable commit hash or a cryptographically signed release rather than cloning the mutable default branch.
- Publish trusted SHA-256 checksums or signatures and require verification before installation or execution.
- Use a dependency lockfile with exact versions and cryptographic hashes, such as a hash-locked requirements file generated through a trusted build process.
- Review direct and transitive dependencies for malicious, abandoned, typosquatted, or dependency-confusion packages.
- Install and run the application in an isolated virtual environment or sandbox using a non-privileged account.
- Avoid automatically executing downloaded code. Present the pinned source and dependency set for inspection before invoking installation or application commands.
