T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
SKILL.md:24- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 24-27
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and unverified third-party package installation
Risk Level: Mediumbash ### Installation ```bash pip install openclawtext ### Technical Analysis The documented installation command retrieves the `openclaw` package from pip's configured package index without specifying an exact version, cryptographic hash, lockfile, or verified source repository. Consequently, the installed code can change independently of this project's reviewed contents. Python packages may execute package-controlled logic during installation, import, or runtime. The dependency is imported by `copywriting_gen.py` and receives the configured API key and user-supplied prompt data. A compromised package release, package-index account, or package source could therefore introduce arbitrary code that is not visible in this repository. This finding establishes a supply-chain exposure; it does not establish that the current `openclaw` package is malicious. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher account or otherwise causes a malicious release to be distributed under the expected package name. 2. A user follows the documentation and runs `pip install openclaw`. 3. Because no version or hash is enforced, pip resolves and installs the attacker-controlled release. 4. Malicious package logic executes during installation, import, client initialization, or an API request. 5. The malicious dependency can access data and resources available to the Python process, including `OPENCLAW_API_KEY`, generated prompts, local files permitted to the user, and network access available in the environment. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user or service account performing installation or running the generator. The affected scope can include theft of the OpenClaw ...[truncated 319 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to an exact, reviewed version rather than installing the latest available release:
bash pip install openclaw==<reviewed-version> - Generate a requirements or lock file containing cryptographic hashes and install with hash verification:
bash pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt - Document the package's verified publisher and canonical source repository so users can validate its provenance.
- Review dependency artifacts before upgrades and use automated supply-chain scanning for known vulnerabilities, malicious releases, and unexpected ownership changes.
- Install and run the package in an isolated virtual environment or container under a non-privileged account.
- Restrict runtime credentials and network access to the minimum necessary. Use a narrowly scoped API key and rotate it if dependency compromise is suspected.
- Establish a controlled update process in which dependency version and hash changes receive security review before deployment.
- Pin the dependency to an exact, reviewed version rather than installing the latest available release: