T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:40- Finding
Unpinned Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 40-43
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: Highbash git clone https://github.com/openclaw-skills/ai-intelligent-content-generation cd ai-intelligent-content-generation pip install -r requirements.txt python app.pyTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions clone a mutable remote Git repository without specifying a verified commit hash, signed tag, or release artifact. They then install dependencies from the retrieved
requirements.txtand execute the retrievedapp.py.Neither
requirements.txtnorapp.pyis included in the audited package, so their contents and security properties cannot be verified. The effective payload may change after this skill has been reviewed. Moreover, Python package installation can execute package build or installation logic beforeapp.pyis launched.This behavior creates a remote code execution channel controlled by the current state of the external repository and its dependency sources. Although no malicious payload is present in the two audited files, the documented procedure crosses the audit boundary and executes unverified remote content.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, its maintainer account, or a dependency source used by its
requirements.txt. - The attacker adds malicious code to
app.py, a package build script, or a substituted dependency. - A user follows the installation instructions and clones the repository without pinning a reviewed revision.
pip install -r requirements.txtexecutes attacker-controlled package installation logic, orpython app.pydirectly launches the modified payload.- The payload runs with the privileges and environment access of the user executing the commands.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation permits arbitrary code execution with the invoking user's privile ...[truncated 598 chars]
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, its maintainer account, or a dependency source used by its
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Include the executable implementation and dependency manifests within the reviewed skill package so the complete runtime behavior is auditable.
- Pin the external source to a specific reviewed commit hash rather than cloning the repository's mutable default branch.
- Prefer signed release artifacts and verify their cryptographic signatures or published checksums before installation.
- Replace unconstrained dependencies with a lock file containing exact versions and cryptographic hashes, such as a hash-locked requirements file.
- Install dependencies in an isolated virtual environment or sandbox under a dedicated, least-privileged account.
- Review all dependencies, including transitive dependencies and package build scripts, before installation.
- Avoid running the application with administrator privileges and restrict access to credentials, sensitive files, and internal networks.
- Add an explicit verification step that aborts installation if the repository revision, release signature, or dependency hashes do not match reviewed values.
