T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:41- Finding
Mutable Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 41–44
Vulnerability Type: Remote code retrieval and insecure dependency installation
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash git clone https://github.com/openclaw-skills/ai-intelligent-churn-prediction cd ai-intelligent-churn-prediction pip install -r requirements.txt python app.pyTechnical Analysis
The distributed skill does not include the application source code or its dependency manifest. Instead, its installation instructions tell users to clone a mutable remote repository, install all packages listed in an unaudited remote
requirements.txt, and execute the remoteapp.py.The Git repository is not pinned to a reviewed commit, release tag, or cryptographically verified artifact. Consequently, the code retrieved when a user follows these instructions may differ from the code available at audit time. The dependency versions and integrity hashes are also unavailable in the audited package, preventing verification of the software supply chain.
This creates two related risks:
- The remote repository owner or an attacker who compromises the repository could alter
app.pyor other imported source files to execute an arbitrary payload. - The remote
requirements.txtcould reference malicious, compromised, unpinned, or substitution-prone packages whose installation scripts execute code duringpip install.
No malicious payload is embedded in the two audited files, and the instructions do not automatically execute without user action. Nevertheless, following the documented installation procedure crosses the audit boundary and runs mutable, unaudited content.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, its maintainer account, or a dependency used by its remote
requirements.txt. - The attacker inserts malicious code into
app.py, an imported module, or a package installation hook. - A user follows ...[truncated 1114 chars]
- The remote repository owner or an attacker who compromises the repository could alter
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Include the complete reviewed application source and dependency manifests in the skill package so the executed implementation is within the audit boundary.
- If remote retrieval is unavoidable, pin the repository to an immutable full commit hash rather than cloning the mutable default branch.
- Verify the downloaded source against an authenticated checksum or cryptographic signature before installation or execution.
- Pin every Python dependency to an exact reviewed version and use a lock file containing package hashes. Install with hash enforcement, such as
pip install --require-hashes. - Use trusted package indexes explicitly and prohibit unreviewed direct URL, Git, local-path, and alternative-index dependencies.
- Audit package metadata and build scripts because Python packages can execute code during source builds or installation.
- Run the application in an isolated, least-privilege environment with restricted filesystem access, no unnecessary credentials, and limited network connectivity.
- Establish a release process in which source revisions and dependencies are reviewed, signed, and reproducibly associated with the declared skill version.
