T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:42- Finding
Unpinned Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 42-45
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval followed by local execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code:
bash git clone https://github.com/openclaw-skills/ai-intelligent-call-center cd ai-intelligent-call-center pip install -r requirements.txt python app.pyTechnical Analysis
The documented installation procedure retrieves a mutable Git repository without pinning or verifying a commit, release artifact, checksum, or signature. It then installs dependencies specified by the retrieved repository and executes its application.
The reviewed skill package does not contain the referenced application source or
requirements.txt. Consequently, the effective code and dependency set cannot be audited from this artifact and may change after this skill has been reviewed. Runningpip installcan itself execute package build or installation logic, whilepython app.pydirectly executes the remotely retrieved application.The publisher metadata is also inconsistent:
SKILL.mdidentifies the author as “OpenClaw Skills Team,” whileskill.jsonidentifies"yang1002378395-cmyk". This inconsistency does not independently establish malicious behavior, but it reduces confidence in the provenance of the remote repository.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, an authorized publisher account, or an unpinned dependency referenced by its
requirements.txt. - The attacker adds malicious application, package-build, or dependency code.
- A user follows the installation instructions and clones the repository's current state.
pip install -r requirements.txtexecutes applicable package installation or build logic.python app.pyexecutes the downloaded application.- The payload operates with the privileges of the user running these commands.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could pr ...[truncated 497 chars]
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, an authorized publisher account, or an unpinned dependency referenced by its
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Include the complete application source and dependency manifest in the reviewed skill package so that the executed implementation matches the audited artifact.
- If remote retrieval is necessary, pin the repository to a specific reviewed commit rather than cloning a mutable default branch.
- Distribute signed release artifacts and verify their cryptographic signatures or SHA-256 checksums before installation or execution.
- Lock every Python dependency to an exact version and require hashes, for example through a generated lock file and
pip install --require-hashes. - Review transitive dependencies and use a trusted package index with controls against dependency confusion and typosquatting.
- Run installation and application startup in an isolated, least-privileged environment without unnecessary secrets, host filesystem access, or administrative permissions.
- Reconcile the author information in
SKILL.mdandskill.json, and document the verified ownership relationship between the skill publisher and the referenced repository.
