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Security audit

Ai Intelligent 3d Model Generation

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill describes a 3D generation app, but its install steps run unpinned remote code that was not included in the reviewed package.

Review the remote repository and dependencies before installing. Prefer a pinned commit or signed release, use an isolated environment with no sensitive credentials, and avoid running the app from a privileged shell or production machine.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:38
Finding
Unpinned Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 38-41 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval followed by dependency installation and code execution **Risk Level**: High ```bash git clone https://github.com/openclaw-skills/ai-intelligent-3d-model-generation cd ai-intelligent-3d-model-generation pip install -r requirements.txt python app.py ``` ### Technical Analysis The distributed skill artifact contains no implementation of its advertised functionality. Instead, its installation instructions direct users to clone a remote Git repository without specifying a commit hash or signed release, install dependencies declared by that remote payload, and execute its application. Because the cloned revision is not pinned, the effective code can change after this skill has been reviewed. The contents of `requirements.txt` are also unavailable in the audited artifact, preventing verification of package names, versions, sources, hashes, and transitive dependencies. Both Python package installation and direct execution of `app.py` can run arbitrary code. This creates a mutable remote execution channel. A compromise of the repository, its maintainer account, the default branch, or a resolved dependency could turn the documented installation process into arbitrary code execution. No malicious remote content can be confirmed from the supplied files; the vulnerability is the unauditable and unpinned retrieval-and-execution design. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the referenced repository, a maintainer account, or one of the dependencies resolved by its `requirements.txt`. 2. The attacker places malicious logic in the default branch, `app.py`, a dependency declaration, or a package installation hook. 3. A user follows the instructions and executes `git clone` without selecting a trusted commit or verified release. 4. `pip install -r requirements.txt` retrieves packages and may execute attacker-controlled ...[truncated 1011 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Include the complete implementation and dependency manifests in the reviewed skill package so the effective payload can be audited before execution. 2. If remote retrieval is unavoidable, pin the repository to a specific, reviewed commit hash rather than cloning a mutable default branch. 3. Publish signed releases and verify the signature and cryptographic checksum before installing or executing downloaded content. 4. Lock all direct and transitive Python dependencies to exact versions and require hashes, such as through a reviewed lock file and `pip install --require-hashes`. 5. Restrict package indexes to explicitly trusted sources and review packages for dependency confusion, typosquatting, and unsafe build hooks. 6. Run installation and application execution inside a least-privileged, isolated environment with no unnecessary credentials, host mounts, or unrestricted network access. 7. Separate download, verification, dependency installation, and execution into explicit steps that fail closed when integrity checks do not pass. 8. Re-audit the pinned source and dependency lock file whenever the approved revision changes.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The description is written entirely in Chinese ("AI 3D模型生成 - 文生3D、图片转3D模型") with no indication that the skill supports other languages or that Chinese is a required locale. This can create an implicit language restriction without user opt-in, which matches the policy concern for language or locale constraints.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.