T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:17
- Finding
- Unverified Community Adapters Execute in an Authenticated Browser Context## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 17-18, 29-35, and 104-111 **Vulnerability Type**: Unverified third-party adapter supply chain **Risk Level**: Medium **Category**: T08: Insecure Dependencies ### Vulnerable Code Snippet ```markdown ## Quick Start ```bash # First time: pull community adapters bb-browser site update ``` ## IMPORTANT: Always use --openclaw Every `bb-browser site` command MUST include `--openclaw` to use OpenClaw's browser: ```bash # Correct bb-browser site twitter/search "AI agent" --openclaw bb-browser site zhihu/hot 10 --openclaw --json bb-browser site xueqiu/hot-stock 5 --openclaw --jq '.items[] | {name, changePercent}' ``` ## Login State Adapters run inside OpenClaw's browser tabs. If a site requires login: 1. The adapter will return an error like `{"error": "HTTP 401", "hint": "Not logged in?"}` 2. Log in to the site in OpenClaw's browser: ```bash openclaw browser open https://twitter.com ``` 3. Complete login manually in the browser window 4. Retry the command ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs users to retrieve unspecified community adapters with `bb-browser site update` and subsequently run those adapters through OpenClaw's browser. The documented workflow deliberately uses the browser's existing authenticated state. No authoritative adapter repository, reviewed version pin, cryptographic checksum, signed manifest, update approval process, or per-adapter permission boundary is documented. Consequently, the effective adapter implementation may change after the Skill itself has been reviewed. If the adapter source or distribution channel is compromised, an untrusted update could be delivered to users and then invoked in a browser context containing active website sessions. The audit did not find evidence that the current adapters are malicious. The confirmed issue is the unsafe trust model and missing supply-chain co ...[truncated 1602 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Document the authoritative adapter registry and require all adapters to originate from an explicitly trusted source. 2. Pin adapters to reviewed, immutable versions rather than automatically consuming the latest community release. 3. Verify updates using cryptographically signed manifests and hashes anchored to trusted publisher identities. 4. Display the source, version, hash, requested domains, and permission changes before installation or update, and require explicit user approval. 5. Isolate each adapter in a sandbox with a deny-by-default policy for filesystem, process, network, and browser access. 6. Restrict each adapter to an allowlist of required website origins and browser capabilities. 7. Prevent adapters from accessing unrelated tabs, cookies, storage, or sessions unless those permissions are necessary and explicitly approved. 8. Run third-party adapters in a dedicated browser profile without unrelated authenticated sessions or sensitive browsing data. 9. Maintain a review and revocation process for compromised adapters and publisher keys. 10. Record adapter installation, update, origin access, and privileged browser operations in auditable logs.