T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:23- Finding
Unpinned Remote Installer Is Downloaded and Executed Directly
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a coherent browser automation skill, but it needs review because installation and several documented browser actions can expose credentials, files, cookies, or recordings without strong safeguards.
Install only if you trust inference.sh and are comfortable with a hosted browser service handling the pages, credentials, files, screenshots, videos, cookies, and proxy settings you send through it. Avoid the pipe-to-shell installer unless you can verify the installer independently, use test or least-privilege accounts, do not upload sensitive local files, avoid recording login or admin flows, and close sessions promptly.
SKILL.md:23Unpinned Remote Installer Is Downloaded and Executed Directly
references/authentication.md:31Authentication, MFA, and Proxy Secrets Are Exposed Through Command Arguments and a Remote Service
SKILL.md:161Arbitrary Local File Upload Is Available Without Path Restrictions or Per-Upload Consent
references/authentication.md:209Authenticated Session Cookies Are Printed in Plaintext
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh downloads and immediately executes a remote script without verification, which is a classic supply-chain and remote code execution risk. If the host, transport, DNS, or distribution pipeline is compromised, users following the quick-start can execute attacker-controlled shell code on their machine.
# Install CLI
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
# Open a page and get interactive elements
infsh app run agent-browser --function open --input '{"url": "https://example.com"}' --session new
The trigger list is very broad and overlaps heavily with ordinary browsing, scraping, and research language, making it likely this powerful browser automation skill will be invoked in situations where a narrower tool would suffice. Because the skill supports clicking, file upload, proxying, and JavaScript execution, over-triggering increases the chance of unintended web actions, sensitive data exposure, or unsafe automation on untrusted sites.
The documentation promotes screenshots and video recording but does not warn that these captures may include credentials, tokens, personal data, or other sensitive on-screen content. In an agentic browsing context, this is especially risky because recordings and screenshots may be stored, returned to callers, or shared for debugging, expanding the exposure surface of sensitive session data.
The proxy example includes proxy URL and credentials without any warning that all browsing traffic, session data, and possibly authentication secrets may transit through a third-party proxy. In a browser automation skill, this materially increases interception and credential-exposure risk, especially if users apply the example to authenticated or sensitive workflows.
The file upload automation example lacks a warning that local files selected by the agent may be transmitted to remote websites, potentially exfiltrating sensitive local data. This is more dangerous in this skill because file upload is an active capability that can directly move local content across trust boundaries with minimal user visibility.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
The cookie extraction section demonstrates retrieving and printing cookies from an authenticated browser session without a clear warning that these values are sensitive session artifacts and may enable session hijacking if copied, logged, or reused. In the context of a browser automation skill that explicitly supports authenticated browsing and JavaScript execution, normalizing cookie extraction increases the chance that users will expose live session data to logs, terminals, or downstream tools.
The documented interact actions include side-effectful operations such as click, fill, upload, check, drag, goto, and keypresses that can submit forms, change account settings, trigger purchases, upload local files, or navigate to untrusted destinations. In a browser automation skill intended for AI agents, omitting explicit safety guidance increases the chance that an agent will perform real-world actions on behalf of a user without confirmation or understanding of consequences.
The execute function allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the page context, which can alter page state, trigger network requests, exfiltrate visible or accessible page data, and perform actions indistinguishable from a user session. Because this skill is explicitly designed for autonomous browser control, documenting raw code execution without strong warnings or guardrails materially raises the risk of misuse and unsafe agent behavior.
The documentation encourages routing browser traffic through third-party proxies but does not warn that the proxy operator can observe destination metadata and potentially page contents, cookies, or credentials depending on the traffic and trust model. In a browser automation skill, this omission is more dangerous because the tool may handle sensitive sessions, authenticated workflows, and scraped data at scale, making users more likely to expose valuable information to untrusted proxy infrastructure.
The authenticated proxy example shows direct handling of proxy usernames and passwords without a prominent warning about credential sensitivity, reuse risk, or secure secret storage. In this skill context, proxy credentials may grant access to corporate egress infrastructure or privacy services, and browser automation users may copy these examples into scripts, logs, shell history, or version control, causing credential leakage.
The recording guidance explains that all browser activity is captured, but the examples around debugging and documentation do not prominently warn that typed inputs, page contents, and other sensitive on-screen data may be recorded and later stored, copied, or shared. In a browser automation skill that can fill forms and interact with authenticated applications, this omission can lead users to unintentionally capture credentials, personal data, or internal admin activity in persistent video artifacts.
This workflow is explicitly designed to collect broad page artifacts including screenshots, full text, links, and optional session video from arbitrary URLs, but it provides no consent warning, sensitivity checks, domain restrictions, or guidance to avoid authenticated/private content. In the context of a browser automation skill with JavaScript execution and recording capabilities, that omission increases the risk of unintentionally capturing credentials, personal data, internal documents, or other sensitive information from visited pages.
The documentation exposes screenshot and video recording features without warning that captures may contain credentials, personal data, session details, or other sensitive on-screen information. In an agent browsing context, automated recording can silently retain or transmit sensitive content beyond what users expect.
The skill documentation shows filling a password field with plaintext example data, but it does not include any warning about credential sensitivity, privacy, or safe handling of secrets. For markdown files, SQP-2 applies when the description omits warnings about behaviors that could affect user data or privacy.
No suspicious patterns detected.