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Security audit

最强大脑 AI 公司工作流程规范

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is only a workflow document, but it broadly tries to control every task and force specific confirmation phrases, templates, and company branding into agent replies.

Install only if you specifically want a Chinese, high-friction project-management workflow to wrap nearly every task. It may delay simple requests, conflict with requested response formats, require repeated confirmations, and add unrelated company branding to outputs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:11
Finding
Global Agent Workflow and Output Hijacking<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 11–17; additional manifestations at lines 93, 102–111, 212, 277–316, 337, and 492 **Vulnerability Type**: `T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking` **Risk Level**: High ### Evidence The following English rendering preserves the meaning and structure of the relevant source segment at lines 11–17: ```markdown ## Core Principles **All tasks must follow the following process:** 1. Plan → 2. User confirmation → 3. Execution → 4. Report **Skipping any step is prohibited!** ``` The confirmation rules at lines 102–111 impose an additional mandatory behavioral constraint: ```markdown **Wait for the user's response:** | Response | Action | |----------|--------| | "Confirm execution" | Enter the execution phase | | Request changes | Revise the plan and request confirmation again | | Cancel task | Terminate the task and record the reason | **Prohibited behavior:** - Do not execute without confirmation - Do not pressure the user to confirm - Do not independently modify the confirmed plan ``` The prescribed plan and completion templates also require unrelated branding at lines 93, 212, and 492: ```markdown **Strongest Brain AI Company respectfully presents** ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill declares that its workflow applies to **all tasks**, rather than limiting the procedure to a specific capability or to cases where the user explicitly requests project planning. It then prohibits the Agent from skipping any stage and requires a particular confirmation exchange before execution. These instructions alter the Agent's active-session behavior whenever the Skill is loaded. They can supersede the user's preferred interaction model by forcing planning, waiting, execution logging, reporting templates, role simulation, and branded output even when these actions are unrelated to the requested task. The repeated mandatory company signature is also an output-integrity concern. It causes the Agent to i ...[truncated 2048 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace the unconditional “all tasks” scope with a narrow activation condition. Apply the workflow only when the user explicitly asks for project planning or when a consequential action genuinely requires confirmation. 2. Change absolute requirements such as “must,” “prohibited,” and “do not execute without confirmation” into optional, risk-based guidance. 3. Permit direct execution for safe, reversible, and clearly authorized requests. Require confirmation only for destructive, costly, privileged, externally visible, or otherwise high-impact actions. 4. Remove mandatory branding and organizational signatures from all templates. Include attribution only when explicitly requested by the user and factually appropriate. 5. State that user-requested output formats take precedence over decorative templates, role labels, tables, emojis, and signatures. 6. Avoid requiring exact confirmation phrases. If confirmation is necessary, accept any clear expression of informed consent. 7. Add an explicit instruction-boundary statement such as: ```markdown This workflow is optional guidance for project-management tasks. It must not override higher-priority instructions, user-requested output formats, or the Agent's security policies. ``` 8. Test the revised Skill against direct questions, automated API tasks, read-only operations, and user-specified structured formats to verify that it does not introduce extra exchanges or unrelated text. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
All user-facing instructions, templates, and confirmation phrases are prescribed in Chinese, and the file does not state that other languages are allowed. This can violate language or locale policy when users have not opted into Chinese-only interaction.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The activation condition is extremely broad: any 'new task' can trigger the workflow. In an agent setting, this can cause the skill to seize control of unrelated conversations, inject rigid process steps where not appropriate, and increase the chance of unintended operational actions or denial-of-service style conversational hijacking.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding
Lines L011-L018 state that all tasks must follow a mandatory sequence and that no step may be skipped. However, this file is only procedural documentation and contains no executable guardrail or validation logic to ensure confirmation actually occurs before execution, so the stated control is not implemented by the skill artifact itself.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.