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Security audit

claude-code-noninteractive-in-node

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent remote Claude Code helper, but it normalizes very broad remote execution permissions and unsafe credential handling without enough guardrails.

Install only if you understand and control the remote Node. Prefer read-only or narrowly allowlisted permissions, avoid `--dangerously-skip-permissions` except in trusted disposable environments, do not paste untrusted task text into the provided shell templates, and use a secret manager or scoped environment injection instead of storing API keys in `.bashrc` or printing any part of them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:16
Finding

Shell Command Injection Through Unescaped Template Placeholders

Content
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&& claude --bare -p "" --max-turns 10'` | | Long streaming task | `bash -lc 'cd && claude --bare -p "" --output-format stream-json --verbose --include-partial-messages --max-turns 30'` | | Full permissions | `bash -lc 'cd && claude --bare -p "" --dangerously-skip-permissions --output-format stream-json --verbose --include-partial-messages --max-turns 30'` | | Read-only analysis | `bash -lc 'cd && claude --bare -p "" --permission-mode plan --allowedTools "Read,Glob,Grep,LSP" --max-turns 10'` | ``` ```json { "command": "bash -lc 'cd && claude --bare -p \"\" --max-turns 10'", "host": "node", "node": "", "background": true, "timeout": 600 } ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented templates insert `` and `` directly into a command interpreted by `bash -lc`. The project path is not quoted, while the task is placed inside nested shell and JSON quotation contexts without a defined escaping mechanism. If either value originates from an untrusted or insufficiently validated source, shell metacharacters, quote characters, command substitutions, or separators can escape the intended argument context. The shell then interprets the injected content as additional commands on the remote Node. Nested quoting does not provide a security boundary. In particular, inserting a double quote into the task can terminate the intended prompt argument, while an unquoted project value can directly introduce shell operators. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker influences the project path or delegated task supplied to the documented command template. 2. The attacker includes shell syntax that escapes the intended `cd` p ...[truncated 1043 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:72
Finding

Insecure API Credential Storage and Diagnostic Disclosure

Content
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Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
SKILL.md:18
Finding

Remote Agent Permission Checks Can Be Completely Bypassed

Content
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&& claude --bare -p "" --dangerously-skip-permissions --output-format stream-json --verbose --include-partial-messages --max-turns 30'` | ``` ```markdown | bypassPermissions | `--permission-mode bypassPermissions` | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | dangerously-skip | `--dangerously-skip-permissions` | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ``` The documented permission table grants file read, file write, shell, Git, and network capabilities in both unrestricted modes. ### Technical Analysis The Skill provides a standard workflow that invokes Claude Code with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`. The associated documentation confirms that this mode permits unrestricted file writes, shell execution, Git operations, and network access. This configuration removes approval and least-privilege boundaries that would otherwise constrain delegated operations. A coding prompt may contain untrusted repository content, issue text, generated instructions, or other attacker-controlled material. If such content influences the agent, the permission bypass gives the resulting behavior direct access to high-impact tools without an intervening authorization decision. The issue is especially significant because execution occurs on a remote Node that may contain credentials, multiple projects, Git identities, or access to internal network resources. ### Attack Path 1. An operator selects the documented full-permission command for a remote coding task. 2. The delegated task or target repository contains malicious, misleading, or otherwise unsafe instructions. 3. Claude Code processes that content while permission checks are disabled. 4. The agent invokes file-write, shell, Git, or network operations without requir ...[truncated 972 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (7)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly documents use of --dangerously-skip-permissions for remote execution but does not include a clear warning that this disables safety controls and may allow unrestricted file changes or command execution on the remote node. In a remote agent skill, normalizing this flag without guardrails materially increases the chance of unsafe delegation, privilege misuse, or destructive actions on the target machine.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The recommendation to write helper scripts to /tmp/ introduces session-persistence and insecure temporary-file risks on multi-user systems, especially if filenames are predictable or permissions are not controlled. Temporary scripts may be read, replaced, or reused by other processes or users, and can leave sensitive task content or executable artifacts behind on the remote node.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

md
## Node Security Workarounds

- Multi-line heredocs → Write script to `/tmp/` first
- Inline Python → Same, use script file
- Write operations → Backup before modifying: `cp f f.bak.$(date +%F)`

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill tells users to place ANTHROPIC_API_KEY directly in ~/.bashrc without warning about credential exposure, shell history leakage, file-permission issues, or the broader implications of storing long-lived secrets in startup files. This can lead to accidental disclosure to other local users, backup systems, dotfile sync tools, or unrelated shell sessions on the remote machine.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The document explicitly presents permission modes that enable file writes, shell, git, and network access, including highly privileged modes like bypassPermissions and dangerously-skip, but it does not warn that these settings can allow arbitrary command execution, repository modification, or outbound data access. In the context of a remote coding agent skill, this omission increases the chance that users enable unsafe modes without understanding the trust boundary or the consequences of delegating broad authority to a remote agent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The example allowedTools configurations include Bash, Edit, and Write without any adjacent warning that Bash can execute system commands and that Edit/Write can alter the filesystem. Because this skill is specifically for remote non-interactive coding on another machine, these examples can normalize granting powerful capabilities to an agent in a context where misuse could affect a remote host and its repositories.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The troubleshooting guide suggests printing the first 10 characters of the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY to verify environment loading. Even partial credential disclosure is sensitive because it can be captured in terminal history, logs, screenshots, or remote session recordings, and normalizes unsafe secret-handling practices in a remote multi-machine workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill presents its operational description and key usage table in Chinese, which can impose a language constraint on users without opt-in. The file does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or provide an alternative language option.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.