Pixel Asset Compiler

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 10:21 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill coherently guides a sprite-asset workflow, with a disclosed npm CLI install fallback that users should pin or verify before use.

Prefer an already installed or project-local reviewed version of pixel-asset-compiler. If installing from npm, pin a trusted version and avoid elevated privileges unless you understand the package provenance.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:28

Finding

Unpinned Global npm Dependency Installation

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 28-31
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through an unpinned third-party package
Risk Level: Medium

markdown

If unavailable, install the published CLI from npm:

```bash
npm install --global pixel-asset-compiler

text

### Technical Analysis

The installation command retrieves the current version of `pixel-asset-compiler` from the npm registry without specifying an exact version or verifying package integrity. The effective code installed and subsequently executed can therefore change after this Skill has been reviewed.

Global npm installation may also execute package lifecycle scripts during installation. If a future package release, package maintainer account, or upstream publishing process is compromised, malicious code could run during installation or when the workflow later invokes the `pixel-asset` executable.

This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current package is malicious. The project does not provide a lockfile, expected integrity hash, or exact reviewed version for this installation path.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the npm package, a maintainer account, or its release pipeline and publishes a malicious new version.
2. A user follows the Skill instructions after finding that `pixel-asset` is unavailable locally.
3. `npm install --global pixel-asset-compiler` resolves and installs the attacker-controlled release because no exact version is pinned.
4. Malicious lifecycle code may execute during installation.
5. The workflow subsequently resolves and runs the globally installed `pixel-asset` command, allowing the malicious package code to execute again.
6. The payload operates with the permissions of the account running npm or the workflow.

### Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the installing or workflow user. This
...[truncated 408 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Pin the dependency to an exact reviewed version, for example:

   bash

   npm install --global pixel-asset-compiler@X.Y.Z
   

2. Prefer a project-local dependency governed by a committed lockfile rather than a global installation.
3. Verify the package's npm integrity metadata or a separately published cryptographic checksum before execution.
4. Document the expected package publisher, source repository, reviewed version, and release provenance.
5. Update dependencies through a controlled review process instead of automatically accepting the latest release.
6. Where practical, install with lifecycle scripts disabled and run the CLI in a restricted environment with only the filesystem and network access required for asset processing.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep