T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
scripts/monitor_page.py:20- Finding
Unrestricted URL Fetching Enables SSRF and Local File Access
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/monitor_page.py, lines 20-24
Vulnerability Type: Server-Side Request Forgery and local resource access
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
python def fetch_page(url: str) -> str: try: import urllib.request req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0"}) with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as r: return r.read().decode("utf-8", errors="ignore") except Exception as e: return f"[ERROR fetching page: {e}]"The value passed to this function originates directly from the required command-line argument:
python p.add_argument("--url", required=True)Technical Analysis
The application passes an unrestricted, user-controlled URL to
urllib.request.urlopen(). It does not validate the URL scheme, destination hostname, resolved IP address, port, or redirect chain.This allows a caller to request resources outside the intended scope of public webpage monitoring. Depending on the protocols supported by the runtime, requests can include local-file URLs as well as HTTP endpoints on loopback, private, link-local, or otherwise internal networks.
The ten-second timeout limits request duration but does not prevent access to unauthorized destinations. Redirects also require validation because an apparently public URL could redirect to a prohibited internal address.
Attack Path
- An attacker or untrusted user controls the value supplied through
--url. - The attacker supplies a local resource URL such as a
file://URL, or an HTTP URL targeting a loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata service. fetch_page()passes the value directly tourllib.request.urlopen().- The request executes with the network reachability and file permissions of the monitoring process.
- The returned content is processed as monitored page data.
monitor()...[truncated 906 chars]
- An attacker or untrusted user controls the value supplied through
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Parse URLs before making requests and permit only explicitly required schemes, preferably
httpsand, if necessary,http. - Reject URLs containing credentials or ambiguous hostname encodings.
- Resolve the destination hostname and reject all loopback, private, link-local, multicast, unspecified, and reserved IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
- Apply the same validation after every DNS resolution and to every redirect destination.
- Protect against DNS rebinding by connecting only to the validated resolved address while preserving the intended hostname for TLS verification.
- Consider an explicit hostname allowlist when the intended monitoring targets are known.
- Restrict destination ports to those required for webpage monitoring.
- Run the monitor under a dedicated, least-privileged account with restricted filesystem and network access.
- Return an explicit fetch failure instead of treating exception text as normal page content.
- Add automated tests covering
file://, loopback, private IPv4, private IPv6, link-local, encoded-address, and redirect-based bypass attempts.
- Parse URLs before making requests and permit only explicitly required schemes, preferably
