Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a disclosed Toobit trading helper, but it can place orders, cancel orders, change futures settings, and withdraw funds if the user confirms those actions.
Install only if you intend to let an agent operate your Toobit account. Use API keys with the minimum permissions needed, avoid withdrawal permission unless required, and carefully review every confirmation prompt for orders, cancellations, leverage, transfers, and withdrawals before approving.
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /api/v1/spot/order
WRITE: Confirm before executing
The skill exposes a cancel-all-open-orders operation and marks the symbol filter as optional, allowing a single confirmed action to wipe all open spot orders across the account. In a natural-language agent context, broad destructive operations are especially risky because ambiguous user phrasing or misparsed parameters can cause account-wide trading disruption.
DELETE /api/v1/spot/openOrders
WRITE: Confirm before executing
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /api/v1/spot/cancelOrderByIds
WRITE: Confirm before executing
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /api/v1/userDataStream
| Param | Required | Description |
|---|
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /api/v1/futures/order
WRITE: Confirm before executing
The batch cancel futures endpoint can cancel broad sets of orders and only requires a symbol, with side optional, making it easy to over-cancel if the agent misinterprets intent. In an automated NL-to-API workflow, broad destructive APIs without strong scoping and preview safeguards create a real risk of unintended trading loss or strategy disruption.
DELETE /api/v1/futures/batchOrders
WRITE: Confirm before executing
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /api/v1/futures/cancelOrderByIds
WRITE: Confirm before executing
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /api/v1/listenKey
| Param | Required | Description |
|---|
The skill description says to use the skill when the user mentions Toobit, or when they want to trade/query crypto on Toobit, but in practice this can over-match generic crypto requests and route users into a high-privilege trading skill. In a skill that can place orders, transfer funds, and withdraw assets, overly broad triggering increases the chance of accidental invocation and unintended execution of sensitive actions.
The usage examples are exclusively written as Chinese user utterances, which implies a fixed language expectation in the skill's natural-language interface. The file does not state that the skill is region-specific or that users may choose another language, so this can violate language/locale neutrality expectations.