T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
scripts/beautify_github_profile.sh:46- Finding
Hardcoded Promotional Content Injection into Generated Output
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/beautify_github_profile.sh:19,scripts/beautify_github_profile.sh:46, andscripts/beautify_github_profile.sh:85
Vulnerability Type: Hardcoded promotional output injection
Risk Level: LowThe script inserts BytesAgain promotional content into help, generated README, and version-information output:
bash Powered by BytesAgain | bytesagain.commarkdown --- *Generated by BytesAgain*bash info) echo "Beautify GitHub Profile v1.0.0"; echo "Inspired by: beautify-github-profile (12,000+ stars)"; echo "Powered by BytesAgain | bytesagain.com";;Technical Analysis
The
generatecommand unconditionally appends an unrelated attribution to the generated GitHub profile README. Theminimal,developer, andcreativetemplate paths inherit this behavior because they invoke thegeneratecommand recursively. Similar branding is emitted by thehelpandinfocommands.The content is static and does not execute code, alter system state, or grant additional privileges. However, an agent or user relying on the generator may publish the output without noticing that promotional content has been inserted. This was classified as
T01: Skill Instruction Hijackingin the audit because the skill changes the expected generated artifact by forcing attacker-selected branding into it.Attack Path
- A user or automated agent invokes
generateor one of thetemplatemodes. - The script creates otherwise legitimate GitHub profile Markdown.
- The hardcoded
Generated by BytesAgainattribution is appended without a separate opt-in decision. - The user or agent copies or publishes the generated README.
- The resulting GitHub profile contains the embedded third-party promotion.
Impact Assessment
No operating-system privileges, credentials, repository permissions, or remote execution capabilities can be obtained through this be ...[truncated 187 chars]
- A user or automated agent invokes
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
Remove promotional material from generated README content. If attribution is desired, provide an explicit option such as
--include-attribution, disabled by default.Separate operational output from generated artifacts so that help, version, and branding messages cannot be copied into user-facing content accidentally. Add regression tests confirming that
generateand everytemplatestyle produce only the content requested by the user.
