T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
scripts/script.sh:68- Finding
Unescaped User-Controlled Data in JSON and CSV Exports
- Content
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> "$out" ``` ```bash echo "$name,$ts,$val" >> "$out" ``` The affected values are read from persisted log files and originate from command input handled by the logging branches, such as: ```bash local input="$*" local ts=$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M') echo "$ts|$input" >> "$DATA_DIR/check.log" ``` Equivalent input handling is repeated for the other logging commands. ### Technical Analysis The export implementation directly interpolates log values into JSON and CSV output without applying format-specific encoding. For JSON exports, values containing double quotes, backslashes, newlines, carriage returns, or other control characters are written verbatim. This can produce invalid JSON or allow attacker-controlled data to alter the apparent structure of the exported document. For CSV exports, fields are not quoted and embedded quotes, commas, and line breaks are not escaped. More importantly, values beginning with spreadsheet formula indicators such as `=`, `+`, `-`, or `@` remain active formulas when the exported file is opened in compatible spreadsheet software. The vulnerability does not directly execute commands inside the CodePal Bash process. Formula evaluation occurs in the context of the application used to open the exported CSV and depends on that application's security behavior. The script also currently contains a separate correctness defect—use of `local` outside functions—that prevents normal argument-bearing command branches from working in standard Bash. Nevertheless, unsafe export remains present for existing, legacy, or otherwise populated log files and would become directly reachable through the intended input flow once that defect is corrected. ### ...[truncated 1683 chars]- Remediation
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