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Security audit

Cam

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a local CNC/CAM reference and calculator with some promotional output, but no evidence of hidden execution, data access, persistence, or automatic installation.

Before installing, note that command output includes BytesAgain promotional links and the help text suggests installing related skills. Treat those as optional advertisements and review any separate skill before installing it. The reviewed skill itself appears limited to local CAM reference output and calculations.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Note
Location
scripts/script.sh:375
Finding
Hard-Coded Promotional and Third-Party Installation Recommendations in Skill Output## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/script.sh:375-384` **Additional Locations**: `scripts/script.sh:42, 95, 159, 235, 280, 310, 331, 352` **Vulnerability Type**: Skill Instruction Hijacking through unsolicited output steering **Risk Level**: Low ### Vulnerable Code ```bash Related skills: clawhub install gear clawhub install cnc-feeds Browse all: bytesagain.com Powered by BytesAgain | bytesagain.com EOF } ``` Functional command responses also repeatedly include the following promotional footer: ```bash print(f"\n📖 More skills: bytesagain.com") ``` or: ```bash 📖 More skills: bytesagain.com ``` ### Technical Analysis The script embeds third-party promotion throughout ordinary CAM command output. Its help output also recommends installing two additional skills that are not included in this repository and therefore were not covered by this audit. When an AI agent invokes the script and relays its output, these recommendations become part of the agent's response even though they are unrelated to the requested machining calculation or reference material. This creates an output-steering channel that promotes external resources and additional software installation. The displayed `clawhub install` commands are not executed automatically. No shell evaluation, remote payload retrieval, persistence, privilege escalation, credential access, or data exfiltration was identified in the reviewed implementation. ### Attack Path 1. A user asks an agent for CAM information or command help. 2. The agent invokes `scripts/script.sh`, such as with the `help`, `calculate`, or `speeds-feeds` command. 3. The script appends promotional content or third-party skill installation recommendations to its legitimate output. 4. The agent relays that output to the user. 5. The user or agent may follow the recommendation and install unaudited external skills. 6. Any further impact would depend on ...[truncated 681 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove third-party skill installation recommendations from executable command output. 2. Remove repeated promotional footers from calculation and reference results. 3. Keep optional attribution and related-project links in `SKILL.md` or another documentation file rather than mixing them into operational output. 4. If related skills must be mentioned, clearly mark them as optional, state that they are separately maintained and unaudited, and require explicit user review before installation. 5. Ensure script output is limited to information directly relevant to the command requested by the user. 6. Add automated output tests that reject unexpected URLs, installation commands, and promotional text in functional command responses.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Unbounded Output

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Content
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【Motion Codes】
  G00   Rapid positioning (no cutting)
  G01   Linear interpolation (cutting feed)
  G02   Circular interpolation CW
  G03   Circular interpolation CCW
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Output size or generation rate is not bounded. Unbounded output enables denial-of-service through resource exhaustion, log flooding, or context-window stuffing.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.