T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
setup.js:31- Finding
Shell Command Injection Through YUKETANG_SECRET
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Rain Classroom skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but its setup flow handles secrets, changes MCP configuration, and includes hidden authenticated install reporting plus an unsafe shell command path.
Review before installing. Do not paste your Rain Classroom secret into chat or logs, avoid running the setup scripts with elevated privileges, and prefer manual MCP configuration if possible. The hidden install report and setup.js command-injection issue should be fixed before broad deployment.
setup.js:31Shell Command Injection Through YUKETANG_SECRET
setup.sh:100Undisclosed Authenticated Installation Telemetry
setup.js:34Registry-Delivered Package Executed During Setup Without Integrity Verification
The declared description frames the skill as a classroom-query assistant, but the content also instructs installation, environment-variable handling, MCP registration, and local configuration changes. This mismatch is dangerous because users may consent to a low-risk data-query skill while the agent performs higher-risk credential and system-configuration actions.
The skill uses sensitive capabilities centered on environment-variable secrets, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That makes the operational boundary unclear and increases the chance an agent will access or manipulate local credentials more broadly than users expect during installation or troubleshooting.
The skill instructs users to place a personal secret into an environment variable and normalizes direct credential handling, but it does not provide a clear warning about secret sensitivity, storage risks, or safe handling practices. This raises the likelihood of accidental exposure through shell history, logs, screenshots, or over-privileged agent access.
The instruction that the agent should directly update a user-provided secret in environment variables on the user's behalf encourages the agent to handle and persist credentials locally. This is risky because it expands the agent's role from guidance to credential manipulation, increasing the chance of secret leakage, unintended persistence, or modification of the wrong execution environment.
The skill references 'npx mcporter' without a pinned version at one location, which can cause execution of a newer or compromised package than intended. In a setup flow that handles secrets and MCP configuration, unpinned package resolution creates a supply-chain risk path.
This reference file presents all user-facing guidance, prompts, and examples exclusively in Chinese. Under the language/locale policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a natural-language policy violation unless the locale constraint is explicitly justified.
The manifest describes a service for querying Rain Classroom account and class data. This setup script invokes npx mcporter through execSync, which runs external code/commands on the user's machine; that capability is not part of the described query functionality itself and is broader than a simple account/class query service.
The setup script modifies local MCP configuration by running mcporter config add ... --scope project without an explicit up-front warning that it will write configuration and add an authenticated remote server. Even though this is likely intended setup behavior, silently changing client config can surprise users and create trust or persistence issues, especially because it also stores an Authorization header for a remote endpoint.
The setup script invokes npx mcporter@0.8.1, which downloads and executes external npm package code during installation. That creates a supply-chain and arbitrary-code-execution risk outside the skill's stated classroom-query purpose, especially because the package is run multiple times and with access to the user's environment including the bearer token.
The script sends install telemetry to the remote MCP service silently via npx mcporter@0.8.1 call yuketang-mcp claw_report --args ..., without explicit consent. In this context, the danger is amplified because the report is sent through an authenticated MCP connection using the user's bearer token, establishing a pattern of undisclosed data transmission from a setup script.
Comments and console output throughout the script are written only in Chinese, including setup guidance and the suggested invocation phrase. This imposes a language choice on users without opt-in or justification, which matches the language/locale policy violation category.
The manifest only describes account/class query features and does not mention credential bootstrap or local secret handling. Reading YUKETANG_SECRET may be operationally useful for setup, but it is a distinct capability outside the skill's stated end-user purpose.
The script explicitly labels the section as silent reporting and performs a remote claw_report call without any user-facing prompt or meaningful disclosure. Even though the transmitted payload is limited to install timing and action metadata, undisclosed telemetry is still a trust and privacy issue, and the 'silent' comment makes the behavior more suspicious rather than less.
The final instruction tells the user to speak to the AI using a Chinese phrase, and the script consistently presents user-facing text only in Chinese. There is no indication that language choice is optional or that the skill is region-specific, which can conflict with language/locale policy expectations.