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Security audit

Dead or Clone

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill has a coherent backup and sharing purpose, but it gives a remote service broad access to workspace and AI state data and can overwrite local configuration from unverified remote ZIP files.

Install only if you are comfortable with broad workspace and agent-state backup to the listed remote service. Before using it, require HTTPS, an explicit file manifest and allowlist, secret redaction, per-action confirmation, revocable or expiring keys, safe ZIP validation, and a way to pause sync and delete remote data.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (4)

other

Error
Location
SKILL.md:32
Finding

Automatic Exfiltration of Sensitive Workspace and Agent-State Data

Content
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Remediation
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T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:112
Finding

Unverified Remote Archive Can Overwrite Agent Configuration

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:150
Finding

Plaintext HTTP Exposes Credentials, Identifiers, and Repository Routing

Content
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"} → Returns: authenticated_url for git push POST /project-mapping Body: {"machine_code": "...", "git_url": "...", "branch_name": "...", "name": "...", "description": "..."} → Returns: {"key": "map_xxx"} GET /project-mapping-zip?key=map_xxx → Returns: {"zip_url": "..."} GET /project-mappings?machine_code=xxx → Returns: list of Keys for this machine ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented API base URL uses unencrypted HTTP. Requests and responses may contain persistent machine identifiers, mapping keys, Git repository information, a Git push URL described as authenticated, and a remotely selected ZIP URL. Without transport encryption and server authentication, a network-positioned attacker can observe or alter these values. If credentials are embedded in the authenticated Git URL, interception may grant direct repository access. Response manipulation could also redirect backup pushes or substitute the archive used for role installation. This weakness compounds the remote archive and backup risks because the protocol does not provide confidentiality, integrity, or reliable authentication of the service endpoint. ### Attack Path 1. The agent connects to `http://clone.kqq.ai:8089` over an untrusted or monitored network. 2. A network attacker intercepts the plaintext request and response. 3. The attacker records the machine code, mapping keys, repository metadata, or authenticated Git URL. 4. Alternatively, the attacker modifies the response to return an attacker-controlled Git or ZIP URL. 5. The agent uploads private data to the substituted repository or installs the substituted role archive. 6. Captured permanent keys can be reused later if no rotation or revocation m ...[truncated 593 chars]
Remediation
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other

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:168
Finding

Stable Hardware Fingerprint Is Collected and Sent to an External Service

Content
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"} ``` ### Technical Analysis The prescribed command reads CPU information and the hardware addresses of all network interfaces, combines them, and produces a stable SHA-256 value. That value is then used as the machine's identity when communicating with the external service. Hashing does not make stable hardware attributes anonymous. CPU characteristics and MAC addresses have constrained and linkable value spaces, and the resulting hash remains a persistent identifier. The service can correlate backup and mapping activity across sessions without an account. The command also reads more hardware data than is necessary to distinguish a local installation. A random locally generated identifier would provide the required functional association without deriving identity from hardware. ### Attack Path 1. The agent reads `/proc/cpuinfo` and network-interface MAC addresses. 2. It hashes the combined hardware data into a stable machine code. 3. The machine code is transmitted with storage and mapping API requests. 4. The external service stores or observes that identifier. 5. Repeated requests can be correlated to the same machine over time. 6. If API records are shared, leaked, or compromised, the identifier can support persistent device profiling. ### Impact Assessment The issue exposes a stable pseudonymous identifier derived from device hardware. It does not directly grant operating-system privileges, but it enables long-term tracking and correlation of a user's backup and role-sharing activity. The affected scope includes the local machine's CPU-derived information and a ...[truncated 218 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The quick-start backup description tells users the AI will 'upload all workspace files' but does not clearly warn that data is sent to a remote service over plain HTTP, nor explain the sensitivity implications. In this skill's context, the omission is especially dangerous because the workflow normalizes automatic exfiltration of workspace content and credentials are reduced to a single reusable key.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The backup trigger phrases are broad enough to activate on ordinary conversation such as 'remember this' or 'save config', which can cause the agent to upload workspace contents without a clear, informed, and specific user request. In this skill, that risk is amplified because backups send files to a remote third-party service and the scope includes sensitive memory/config files like SOUL.md, USER.md, and MEMORY.md.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The share flow encourages generating and sending a key but does not prominently warn that possession of the key allows others to retrieve and apply the exact configuration. Since the skill frames sharing as easy and portable, users may disclose keys without understanding they function as bearer credentials for sensitive role/config data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The restore conditions allow activation based on ambiguous context like a 'new device detected' or the service indicating existing data, which may steer users into restoring state they did not intend to apply. In a system that can overwrite local configuration and recover prior workspace content, ambiguous restore prompting can lead to unwanted state changes, privacy exposure, or cross-context contamination.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The role-application trigger accepts vague input like 'try this Key', making it too easy to invoke a destructive workflow that downloads and overwrites configuration from a remote source. Because the role flow stashes current state, creates branches, and applies remote ZIP content, weak intent matching increases the chance of accidental or socially engineered reconfiguration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
76% confidence
Finding

The prompt explicitly recommends restoring previous data, encouraging persistence of prior session state onto the current device. In an agent environment, carrying forward historical data can expose prior user context, secrets, or behavioral state in situations where the current session should remain isolated.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 212)May include surrounding context.

md
This device has previous backups.

Options:
[1] Enter Key to restore previous data
[2] Create new backup (history preserved but needs Key)

Recommendation: Try restore first.