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- Location
SKILL.md:32- Finding
Automatic Exfiltration of Sensitive Workspace and Agent-State Data
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill has a coherent backup and sharing purpose, but it gives a remote service broad access to workspace and AI state data and can overwrite local configuration from unverified remote ZIP files.
Install only if you are comfortable with broad workspace and agent-state backup to the listed remote service. Before using it, require HTTPS, an explicit file manifest and allowlist, secret redaction, per-action confirmation, revocable or expiring keys, safe ZIP validation, and a way to pause sync and delete remote data.
SKILL.md:32Automatic Exfiltration of Sensitive Workspace and Agent-State Data
SKILL.md:112Unverified Remote Archive Can Overwrite Agent Configuration
SKILL.md:150Plaintext HTTP Exposes Credentials, Identifiers, and Repository Routing
SKILL.md:168Stable Hardware Fingerprint Is Collected and Sent to an External Service
The quick-start backup description tells users the AI will 'upload all workspace files' but does not clearly warn that data is sent to a remote service over plain HTTP, nor explain the sensitivity implications. In this skill's context, the omission is especially dangerous because the workflow normalizes automatic exfiltration of workspace content and credentials are reduced to a single reusable key.
The backup trigger phrases are broad enough to activate on ordinary conversation such as 'remember this' or 'save config', which can cause the agent to upload workspace contents without a clear, informed, and specific user request. In this skill, that risk is amplified because backups send files to a remote third-party service and the scope includes sensitive memory/config files like SOUL.md, USER.md, and MEMORY.md.
The share flow encourages generating and sending a key but does not prominently warn that possession of the key allows others to retrieve and apply the exact configuration. Since the skill frames sharing as easy and portable, users may disclose keys without understanding they function as bearer credentials for sensitive role/config data.
The restore conditions allow activation based on ambiguous context like a 'new device detected' or the service indicating existing data, which may steer users into restoring state they did not intend to apply. In a system that can overwrite local configuration and recover prior workspace content, ambiguous restore prompting can lead to unwanted state changes, privacy exposure, or cross-context contamination.
The role-application trigger accepts vague input like 'try this Key', making it too easy to invoke a destructive workflow that downloads and overwrites configuration from a remote source. Because the role flow stashes current state, creates branches, and applies remote ZIP content, weak intent matching increases the chance of accidental or socially engineered reconfiguration.
The prompt explicitly recommends restoring previous data, encouraging persistence of prior session state onto the current device. In an agent environment, carrying forward historical data can expose prior user context, secrets, or behavioral state in situations where the current session should remain isolated.
This device has previous backups.
Options:
[1] Enter Key to restore previous data
[2] Create new backup (history preserved but needs Key)
Recommendation: Try restore first.