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Security audit

庄家异动探测器

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s market-data and payment purpose is mostly disclosed, but it ships a hardcoded payment API credential and can send it to an environment-configured endpoint.

Review before installing. The payment feature is disclosed and purpose-aligned, but the publisher should remove and rotate the embedded SkillPay key, actually read SKILLPAY_API_KEY from the environment, restrict SkillPay API hosts to approved HTTPS origins, and update the pinned HTTP dependency.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
main.py:10
Finding

Hardcoded SkillPay API Credential Can Be Disclosed Through a Configurable Network Endpoint

Content
View full analysis
Tuple[str, str]: if not SKILLPAY_API_KEY: raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Missing SKILLPAY_API_KEY") url = f"{SKILLPAY_API_BASE.rstrip('/')}/v1/charges" headers = { "Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLPAY_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json", } body = { "amount": amount, "currency": currency, "title": "OpenClaw Skill Payment", "description": "Polymarket Movers x3", } r = requests.post(url, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=20) if r.status_code not in (200, 201): raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="SkillPay create charge failed") data = r.json() cid = str(data.get("id") or data.get("charge_id") or "") purl = data.get("payment_url") if not purl and cid: purl = f"{SKILLPAY_WEB_BASE.rstrip('/')}/checkout/{cid}" if not cid or not purl: raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Invalid SkillPay response") return cid, purl ``` It is also transmitted during payment-status queries: ```python def get_skillpay_status(charge_id: str) -> str: if not SKILLPAY_API_KEY: raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Missing SKILLPAY_API_KEY") url = f"{SKILLPAY_API_BASE.rstrip('/')}/v1/charges/{charge_id}" headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLPAY_API_KE ...[truncated 3219 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (10)

Tainted flow: 'url' from os.getenv (line 231, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 174)May include surrounding context.

python
]
    for url in candidates:
        try:
            r = requests.get(url, timeout=15)
            if r.status_code != 200:
                continue
            payload = r.json()

Tainted flow: 'url' from os.getenv (line 231, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The payment API base URL is taken from an environment variable and used to send an authenticated POST request with the bearer key. If that environment variable is altered in deployment, the service will transmit the embedded SkillPay secret to an attacker-controlled endpoint, causing immediate credential exfiltration and enabling fraudulent charge operations.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 216)May include surrounding context.

python
"title": "OpenClaw Skill Payment",
        "description": "Polymarket Movers x3",
    }
    r = requests.post(url, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=20)
    if r.status_code not in (200, 201):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="SkillPay create charge failed")
    data = r.json()

Tainted flow: 'url' from os.getenv (line 231, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This authenticated GET request also uses a URL derived from an environment-controlled base while attaching the SkillPay bearer token. A compromised deployment configuration can redirect status queries to a malicious host and leak the secret, after which an attacker may impersonate the service against the payment provider.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 233)May include surrounding context.

python
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Missing SKILLPAY_API_KEY")
    url = f"{SKILLPAY_API_BASE.rstrip('/')}/v1/charges/{charge_id}"
    headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLPAY_API_KEY}"}
    r = requests.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=20)
    if r.status_code != 200:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="SkillPay status query failed")
    data = r.json()

Possible Typosquatting: 'uvicorn' resembles popular package 'gunicorn'

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Package name closely resembles a popular package, suggesting possible typosquatting. Attackers publish malicious packages with similar names to trick developers into installing them.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The natural-language content of the skill is entirely Chinese, and the file does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or that users may choose another language. This can violate a language/locale policy when users are not given an explicit opt-in or alternative.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill's observable function is market-data retrieval, but it also creates and checks cryptocurrency payment charges before returning results. This hidden coupling increases operational and trust risk because users invoking a simple data skill may trigger financial workflow logic and related third-party data sharing they did not reasonably expect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The code performs payment-provider interactions without any in-file user-facing disclosure or consent mechanism beyond returning a charge object from the API. In an agent-skill context, that makes the behavior more dangerous because callers may not understand they are engaging a third-party payment system or that identifiers and payment metadata are being transmitted externally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 216)May include surrounding context.

python
"title": "OpenClaw Skill Payment",
        "description": "Polymarket Movers x3",
    }
    r = requests.post(url, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=20)
    if r.status_code not in (200, 201):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="SkillPay create charge failed")
    data = r.json()

Known Vulnerable Dependency: requests==2.31.0 — 6 advisory(ies): CVE-2024-47081 (Requests vulnerable to .netrc credentials leak via malicious URLs); CVE-2024-35195 (Requests `Session` object does not verify requests after making first request wi); CVE-2026-25645 (Requests has Insecure Temp File Reuse in its extract_zipped_paths() utility func) +3 more

Medium
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The dependency is pinned to requests==2.31.0, and the static analysis indicates multiple published advisories affecting that version. Using a known vulnerable HTTP client library is dangerous because it can expose credentials, weaken TLS/request verification behavior, or introduce unsafe file-handling paths depending on how the application uses requests. In a FastAPI-based skill, outbound HTTP requests are common, which makes this more relevant rather than theoretical.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The manifest description is written entirely in Chinese and indicates the skill's behavior in a way that implies a Chinese-language interaction model. There is no accompanying documentation of user language choice, opt-in, or a clear region-specific justification, which conflicts with the policy against forcing a specific language or locale without user consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.