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Security audit

庄家异动探测器

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly coherent as a paid Polymarket market-mover API, but it ships a hardcoded payment-service bearer key and has weak payment authorization controls.

Review before installing. The skill does what it claims at a high level, but the publisher should remove and rotate the embedded SkillPay key, restrict the payment API host, upgrade vulnerable dependencies, and bind/consume paid charge IDs server-side before this is used with real payments.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
main.py:10
Finding

Hard-Coded SkillPay Bearer Credential Exposed and Transmitted

Content
View full analysis
Tuple[str, str]: if not SKILLPAY_API_KEY: raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Missing SKILLPAY_API_KEY") url = f"{SKILLPAY_API_BASE.rstrip('/')}/v1/charges" headers = { "Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLPAY_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json", } body = { "amount": amount, "currency": currency, "title": "OpenClaw Skill Payment", "description": "Polymarket Movers x3", } r = requests.post(url, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=20) if r.status_code not in (200, 201): raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="SkillPay create charge failed") data = r.json() cid = str(data.get("id") or data.get("charge_id") or "") purl = data.get("payment_url") if not purl and cid: purl = f"{SKILLPAY_WEB_BASE.rstrip('/')}/checkout/{cid}" if not cid or not purl: raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Invalid SkillPay response") return cid, purl def get_skillpay_status(charge_id: str) -> str: if not SKILLPAY_API_KEY: raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Missing SKILLPAY_API_KEY") url = f"{SKILLPAY_API_BASE.rstrip('/')}/v1/charges/{charge_id}" headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLPAY_API_KEY}"} r = requests.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=20) if r.status_code != 200: raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="SkillPay status q ...[truncated 2356 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
main.py:243
Finding

Caller-Supplied Paid Charge IDs Can Be Replayed or Substituted

Content
View full analysis
MoversResponse: if not req.charge_id: cid, purl = create_skillpay_charge(PRICE_AMOUNT, PRICE_CURRENCY) return MoversResponse(requires_payment=True, charge_id=cid, payment_url=purl, status="pending") status = "" for _ in range(10): status = get_skillpay_status(req.charge_id) if status in ["paid", "succeeded", "success", "completed"]: break if status in ["failed", "canceled", "expired"]: return MoversResponse(requires_payment=True, charge_id=req.charge_id, payment_url=None, status=status) time.sleep(3) if status not in ["paid", "succeeded", "success", "completed"]: return MoversResponse(requires_payment=True, charge_id=req.charge_id, payment_url=None, status=status or "pending") markets = fetch_markets() top10 = pick_active_top10(markets) movers = compute_movers(top10) return MoversResponse(requires_payment=False, data=movers, status="ok") ``` ### Technical Analysis The application treats any caller-supplied `charge_id` with a successful status as sufficient authorization to access the paid result. It does not maintain a server-side association between the charge and the invocation for which it was created. After retrieving the status, the application does not verify: - That this application created the charge. - That the charge belongs to the expected merchant or requester. - That the amount is exactly `0.01`. - That the currency is `USDT`. - That the charge metadata identifies the intended Skill operation. - That the charge has not already been consumed. - That the charge is bound to a specific user, session, or one-time entitlement. Because successful charge ...[truncated 1620 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
Findings (13)

Tainted flow: 'url' from os.getenv (line 230, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 173)May include surrounding context.

python
]
    for url in candidates:
        try:
            r = requests.get(url, timeout=15)
            if r.status_code != 200:
                continue
            payload = r.json()

Tainted flow: 'url' from os.getenv (line 230, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 215)May include surrounding context.

python
"title": "OpenClaw Skill Payment",
        "description": "Polymarket Movers x3",
    }
    r = requests.post(url, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=20)
    if r.status_code not in (200, 201):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="SkillPay create charge failed")
    data = r.json()

Tainted flow: 'url' from os.getenv (line 230, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 232)May include surrounding context.

python
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Missing SKILLPAY_API_KEY")
    url = f"{SKILLPAY_API_BASE.rstrip('/')}/v1/charges/{charge_id}"
    headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLPAY_API_KEY}"}
    r = requests.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=20)
    if r.status_code != 200:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="SkillPay status query failed")
    data = r.json()

Possible Typosquatting: 'uvicorn' resembles popular package 'gunicorn'

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Package name closely resembles a popular package, suggesting possible typosquatting. Attackers publish malicious packages with similar names to trick developers into installing them.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill description states that it automatically handles cryptocurrency payment callbacks, but it does not provide any user-facing warning or disclosure about payment-triggered effects, charges, or financial risk. In a crypto-focused skill with a paywall, lack of clear notice can mislead users about when payments occur or what actions may have financial consequences, increasing the chance of unintended charges or abuse of payment flows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The code contains a hardcoded default value for SKILLPAY_API_KEY that appears to be a live secret format, meaning sensitive credentials may be embedded directly in source. Hardcoded API keys can be extracted by anyone with code access and abused to create charges, query payment data, or impersonate the service to the payment provider.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill embeds payment processing and gates core functionality behind a charge flow, but the file provides little transparency about billing behavior, refund handling, or trust boundaries. In an agent-skill ecosystem, hidden monetization logic can mislead users or platforms and create abuse or unauthorized charging risk if invoked unexpectedly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The code performs billing-related network actions using a bearer credential without any in-band disclosure to the caller before creating or checking charges. In a skill context, that makes the payment flow less transparent and increases the risk of confusing or unexpected billable actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 215)May include surrounding context.

python
"title": "OpenClaw Skill Payment",
        "description": "Polymarket Movers x3",
    }
    r = requests.post(url, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=20)
    if r.status_code not in (200, 201):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="SkillPay create charge failed")
    data = r.json()

Known Vulnerable Dependency: requests==2.31.0 — 6 advisory(ies): CVE-2024-47081 (Requests vulnerable to .netrc credentials leak via malicious URLs); CVE-2024-35195 (Requests `Session` object does not verify requests after making first request wi); CVE-2026-25645 (Requests has Insecure Temp File Reuse in its extract_zipped_paths() utility func) +3 more

Medium
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The dependency is pinned to requests==2.31.0, and the finding cites multiple published advisories affecting that version. Using a known-vulnerable HTTP client can expose the application to credential leakage, TLS/session verification flaws, or unsafe file-handling behavior depending on how the library is used. In a FastAPI-based skill that likely makes outbound network requests, this context makes the issue more relevant rather than theoretical.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The manifest description is written only in Chinese, which imposes a specific language/locale without indicating user choice or a region-specific justification. The policy requires either user opt-in or clear documentation when a skill is language-constrained.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

SQP-3 applies to all file types and includes language or locale policy violations. The file content is presented entirely in Chinese and does not indicate that users can choose another language or that the locale limitation is intentional and justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
74% confidence
Finding

The code retrieves payment service configuration and an API key from environment variables even though no manifest describes a purpose requiring privileged billing credentials. In the absence of declared intent, accessing such credentials is an unjustified capability.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.