T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning
- Location
index.js:35- Finding
Untrusted Daily Log Content Can Poison Persistent Agent Memory
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill has a coherent memory-enhancement purpose, but it automatically sends personal daily logs to an external model and lets a spawned agent write long-term memory without review.
Review this before installing if your daily logs contain private, sensitive, regulated, or third-party information. Enable it only if you are comfortable with automatic external model analysis and model-written long-term memory entries, and prefer a version with explicit opt-in, preview-before-write, schema validation, and a local-only or redacted processing option.
index.js:35Untrusted Daily Log Content Can Poison Persistent Agent Memory
The skill is designed to extract personal details from daily logs and persist them into long-term memory stores such as preferences, contacts, habits, and projects. In this context, the absence of privacy controls, validation, retention limits, and injection-resistant handling makes the behavior dangerous because sensitive information is automatically transformed into durable profile data that may be inaccurate, overbroad, or unauthorized.
The skill explicitly states that a sub-agent sends daily log content to OpenRouter for analysis, but it does not warn users that potentially sensitive diary or memory data will be transmitted to an external third-party service. Because the skill runs automatically via cron and processes personal logs, users may unknowingly expose private information, contacts, habits, and project details outside the local environment.
The prompt explicitly instructs the sub-agent to modify several persistent memory files and append to a top-level MEMORY.md file based on free-form log content. Because these writes are driven by model interpretation rather than deterministic code, the skill allows long-term state changes from potentially adversarial or sensitive input without validation, review, or tight scope control.
The skill instructs a sub-agent to update multiple persistent files and append to MEMORY.md, but there is no user-facing notice that these writes will occur. Silent persistence of interpreted personal data increases the risk of unwanted retention, inaccurate memory entries, and user surprise about the scope of modifications.
The skill sends the full contents of a daily memory log to an external model endpoint without any disclosure, minimization, or consent mechanism. Since the logs may contain personal contacts, habits, projects, and other sensitive details, this creates a privacy and data-governance exposure even if the model behaves as intended.
The skill delegates a sensitive operation to a spawned AI session and relies on prompt instructions to drive file-updating behavior, but it does not constrain or verify what the sub-agent is allowed to do. This creates an agentic integrity risk: untrusted daily-log content is embedded directly into the sub-agent prompt, so prompt injection in the log could influence downstream actions or cause unintended persistence behavior.
No suspicious patterns detected.