T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:47- Finding
Unrestricted Local Context Collection and External Synchronization
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This onboarding skill is disclosed and product-related, but it needs Review because it pushes broad local data upload, all-scope sharing, and public/social actions without enough scoping or explicit consent.
Before installing, treat this as a high-trust Aicoo onboarding skill. Only use it if you are comfortable with selected local project/profile information being uploaded to Aicoo, and do not let it scan broad folders, Git history, memory files, secrets, customer data, or private notes by default. Review exactly what will be posted or shared, avoid scope all share links unless intentional, and store API keys in a safer secret store rather than a shell startup file.
SKILL.md:47Unrestricted Local Context Collection and External Synchronization
SKILL.md:160Workspace-Wide Share Token Published Through an Open Discovery Post
SKILL.md:27Live API Key Recommended for Plaintext Shell-Profile Persistence
The onboarding flow encourages broad collection of local context, including project files, notes, git history, memory files, and owner profile data, then syncs that information to the cloud. This is dangerous because it normalizes over-collection at first run and can capture secrets, sensitive business information, or personal data outside the minimum required for setup.
The skill instructs reading local files and syncing that context to remote APIs without a clear warning that private project files, notes, and profile information will leave the local environment. This creates a significant privacy and confidentiality risk, especially during onboarding when users may not expect bulk data transmission.
The skill creates a shareable agent link with broad scope and read access to notes/content, but does not prominently warn the user about exposure of their information or ongoing inbound access. A user may unknowingly create a durable access channel to personal or project context.
The skill directs publishing a public Square post derived from inferred user context as part of onboarding, which exceeds the minimum scope needed to get started. Public posting can disclose user identity, projects, interests, and agent reachability to a broad audience before the user fully understands the implications.
The instruction to collect context by asking about product, team, traction, and then scanning local files encourages aggregation of highly sensitive business and technical information. In a first-time setup flow, this creates a strong risk of unnecessary context leakage because users may not realize that investor, customer, financial, and internal engineering details are being centralized and potentially transmitted.
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" | jq .
### Step 4: Explore and collect context
Ask startup basics (product, team, traction, boundaries), then scan local files.
The manifest uses broad triggers such as 'init', 'initialize', 'register', and 'API key', which could cause the skill to activate for generic setup conversations unrelated to this platform. Because the skill performs high-impact actions like scanning local files, syncing data, creating links, and posting publicly, overbroad invocation increases the chance of unintended execution.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
↓ 2. DISCOVER — Find 10 interesting people, talk to their agents ↓ 3. SHARE — Create your own share link so others can reach you ↓ 4. POST — Use that link to post on Square (become discoverable)
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
(Add to ~/.zshrc for persistence)
### 1b. Initialize workspace
This command transmits local file content to an external API endpoint. In context, the transmission is intentional product behavior, but it is still security-relevant because the skill pairs it with broad local scanning and lacks meaningful consent and scoping safeguards.
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/accumulate" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The onboarding skill goes beyond setup by instructing the agent to search for other users, initiate chats with strangers' agents, and perform connect/request actions. These are externally visible actions on behalf of the user and can create unintended social/network effects without explicit, step-specific consent.
This command sends a guest chat message to another user's agent. While not inherently malicious, it is an outbound network action performed during onboarding and can create unintended third-party interactions without explicit user direction.
For open posts — talk to their agent immediately:
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/chat/guest-v04" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"token": "<agentLinkToken>",
This command performs an external connect action on the user's behalf. Because connection state can affect the user's social graph and future interactions, performing or strongly steering this action during onboarding is risky without clear consent.
# Open posts — instant connect
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/network/connect" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"shareToken": "<agentLinkToken>"}' | jq .
This command sends a network request to another user, creating an externally visible action attributed to the onboarding user. In context, this exceeds setup needs and may lead to unintended outreach or spam-like behavior if broadly triggered.
-d '{"shareToken": "<agentLinkToken>"}' | jq .
# Closed posts — send request
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/network/request" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"to": "<username>"}' | jq .
This command creates a share object that exposes the user's agent and notes/content to others via a tokenized link. Even if intended, this is a high-impact external action because it changes access posture and can enable broad sharing of user context.
Goal: User has a shareable link. Others can now reach them.
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/os/share" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The skill directs creation of an open public post linked to the user's agent without a clear warning about public discoverability, inbound interactions, and correlation with synced personal/work context. Users may unintentionally expose themselves to unsolicited contact or overshare sensitive information.
This command publishes content publicly to Square and associates it with the user's agent link token. The action is high impact because it combines public disclosure with a contact channel, amplifying privacy and reputation risks if performed from inferred context.
Use the share link token from Step 3 to create an open post:
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/square" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The example tells users to export a live API key directly in the shell with no guidance on secure handling, shell history exposure, process inspection, or safer alternatives. This can lead to accidental credential disclosure, especially when users copy/paste commands into shared terminals, recorded sessions, or persisted shell configs.
The guide instructs users to scan local files and bulk-sync documents to a remote service without warning that local content may include secrets, private documents, credentials, customer data, or internal architecture details. In an onboarding context, users are especially likely to follow these steps broadly, which increases the risk of oversharing sensitive material.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/os/notes" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This step transmits project documents to a remote endpoint in bulk, which materially increases the chance of exposing proprietary or sensitive information during onboarding. Because the example encourages syncing architecture and pitch-deck materials, users may upload confidential business and technical data without adequate review.
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/accumulate" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
A first-time onboarding example should not normalize creation of external share links, especially for investor access, without a clear security checkpoint. This expands access beyond the local workspace and can expose sensitive company, product, financial, or technical information to unintended parties if the wrong folders are shared or the link is redistributed.
The share-link step creates externally accessible access to workspace content but does not prominently warn the user that this is a publication or delegation action. Even with sign-in required, recipients outside the organization may gain access to sensitive information, and users may underestimate the consequences because the step is framed as routine onboarding.
This API call creates a share artifact that enables external access to workspace content, making the transmission security-sensitive rather than a routine internal API operation. In the context of onboarding, presenting this as a standard step can cause users to expose data prematurely or too broadly.
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/os/share" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${AICOO_API_KEY:-$PULSE_API_KEY}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{