Back to skill

Security audit

Aicoo Onboarding

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This onboarding skill is disclosed and product-related, but it needs Review because it pushes broad local data upload, all-scope sharing, and public/social actions without enough scoping or explicit consent.

Before installing, treat this as a high-trust Aicoo onboarding skill. Only use it if you are comfortable with selected local project/profile information being uploaded to Aicoo, and do not let it scan broad folders, Git history, memory files, secrets, customer data, or private notes by default. Review exactly what will be posted or shared, avoid scope all share links unless intentional, and store API keys in a safer secret store rather than a shell startup file.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
SKILL.md:47
Finding

Unrestricted Local Context Collection and External Synchronization

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
SKILL.md:160
Finding

Workspace-Wide Share Token Published Through an Open Discovery Post

Content
View full analysis
Anyone with this link can talk to your agent (read-only, sign-in required). ``` ```bash curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/square" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "subsquare": "builders", "title": "", "content": "", "tags": ["", ""], "reachability": "open", "agentLinkToken": "" }' | jq . ``` ### Technical Analysis The share operation uses `"scope": "all"` together with read access to notes. This grants the token access to the entire synchronized workspace instead of limiting it to information intentionally prepared for public use. The same token is then attached to a Square post configured with `"reachability": "open"`. While `"requireSignIn": true` prevents anonymous access, it does not enforce least privilege or limit access to specifically approved recipients. An authenticated third party who discovers the post may be able to interact with the shared agent using knowledge derived from all synchronized content. This is particularly dangerous when combined with the earlier broad local-context synchronization behavior. Material collected from notes, Git history, and agent memory can enter the workspace before a workspace-wide token is created. ### Attack Path 1. The onboardi ...[truncated 1131 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:27
Finding

Live API Key Recommended for Plaintext Shell-Profile Persistence

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (23)

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The onboarding flow encourages broad collection of local context, including project files, notes, git history, memory files, and owner profile data, then syncs that information to the cloud. This is dangerous because it normalizes over-collection at first run and can capture secrets, sensitive business information, or personal data outside the minimum required for setup.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs reading local files and syncing that context to remote APIs without a clear warning that private project files, notes, and profile information will leave the local environment. This creates a significant privacy and confidentiality risk, especially during onboarding when users may not expect bulk data transmission.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill creates a shareable agent link with broad scope and read access to notes/content, but does not prominently warn the user about exposure of their information or ongoing inbound access. A user may unknowingly create a durable access channel to personal or project context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill directs publishing a public Square post derived from inferred user context as part of onboarding, which exceeds the minimum scope needed to get started. Public posting can disclose user identity, projects, interests, and agent reachability to a broad audience before the user fully understands the implications.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context Leakage

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The instruction to collect context by asking about product, team, traction, and then scanning local files encourages aggregation of highly sensitive business and technical information. In a first-time setup flow, this creates a strong risk of unnecessary context leakage because users may not realize that investor, customer, financial, and internal engineering details are being centralized and potentially transmitted.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/first-time-setup.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

-H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" | jq .

text

### Step 4: Explore and collect context

Ask startup basics (product, team, traction, boundaries), then scan local files.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The manifest uses broad triggers such as 'init', 'initialize', 'register', and 'API key', which could cause the skill to activate for generic setup conversations unrelated to this platform. Because the skill performs high-impact actions like scanning local files, syncing data, creating links, and posting publicly, overbroad invocation increases the chance of unintended execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

↓ 2. DISCOVER — Find 10 interesting people, talk to their agents ↓ 3. SHARE — Create your own share link so others can reach you ↓ 4. POST — Use that link to post on Square (become discoverable)

text

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

  1. Generate a key
  2. Run: export AICOO_API_KEY=aicoo_sk_live_xxxxxxxx

(Add to ~/.zshrc for persistence)

text

### 1b. Initialize workspace

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This command transmits local file content to an external API endpoint. In context, the transmission is intentional product behavior, but it is still security-relevant because the skill pairs it with broad local scanning and lacks meaningful consent and scoping safeguards.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

1d. Sync to Aicoo

bash
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/accumulate" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The onboarding skill goes beyond setup by instructing the agent to search for other users, initiate chats with strangers' agents, and perform connect/request actions. These are externally visible actions on behalf of the user and can create unintended social/network effects without explicit, step-specific consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This command sends a guest chat message to another user's agent. While not inherently malicious, it is an outbound network action performed during onboarding and can create unintended third-party interactions without explicit user direction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 141)May include surrounding context.

For open posts — talk to their agent immediately:

bash
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/chat/guest-v04" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "token": "<agentLinkToken>",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This command performs an external connect action on the user's behalf. Because connection state can affect the user's social graph and future interactions, performing or strongly steering this action during onboarding is risky without clear consent.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 156)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Open posts — instant connect
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/network/connect" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"shareToken": "<agentLinkToken>"}' | jq .

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This command sends a network request to another user, creating an externally visible action attributed to the onboarding user. In context, this exceeds setup needs and may lead to unintended outreach or spam-like behavior if broadly triggered.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 162)May include surrounding context.

md
-d '{"shareToken": "<agentLinkToken>"}' | jq .

# Closed posts — send request
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/network/request" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"to": "<username>"}' | jq .

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This command creates a share object that exposes the user's agent and notes/content to others via a tokenized link. Even if intended, this is a high-impact external action because it changes access posture and can enable broad sharing of user context.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 177)May include surrounding context.

Goal: User has a shareable link. Others can now reach them.

bash
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/os/share" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill directs creation of an open public post linked to the user's agent without a clear warning about public discoverability, inbound interactions, and correlation with synced personal/work context. Users may unintentionally expose themselves to unsolicited contact or overshare sensitive information.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This command publishes content publicly to Square and associates it with the user's agent link token. The action is high impact because it combines public disclosure with a contact channel, amplifying privacy and reputation risks if performed from inferred context.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 213)May include surrounding context.

Use the share link token from Step 3 to create an open post:

bash
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/square" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The example tells users to export a live API key directly in the shell with no guidance on secure handling, shell history exposure, process inspection, or safer alternatives. This can lead to accidental credential disclosure, especially when users copy/paste commands into shared terminals, recorded sessions, or persisted shell configs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The guide instructs users to scan local files and bulk-sync documents to a remote service without warning that local content may include secrets, private documents, credentials, customer data, or internal architecture details. In an onboarding context, users are especially likely to follow these steps broadly, which increases the risk of oversharing sensitive material.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/first-time-setup.md (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

Step 5: Create first note (OS endpoint)

bash
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/os/notes" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This step transmits project documents to a remote endpoint in bulk, which materially increases the chance of exposing proprietary or sensitive information during onboarding. Because the example encourages syncing architecture and pitch-deck materials, users may upload confidential business and technical data without adequate review.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/first-time-setup.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

Step 6: Bulk sync project docs

bash
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/accumulate" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $AICOO_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

A first-time onboarding example should not normalize creation of external share links, especially for investor access, without a clear security checkpoint. This expands access beyond the local workspace and can expose sensitive company, product, financial, or technical information to unintended parties if the wrong folders are shared or the link is redistributed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The share-link step creates externally accessible access to workspace content but does not prominently warn the user that this is a publication or delegation action. Even with sign-in required, recipients outside the organization may gain access to sensitive information, and users may underestimate the consequences because the step is framed as routine onboarding.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This API call creates a share artifact that enables external access to workspace content, making the transmission security-sensitive rather than a routine internal API operation. In the context of onboarding, presenting this as a standard step can cause users to expose data prematurely or too broadly.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/first-time-setup.md (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

Step 7: Create investor share link

bash
curl -s -X POST "https://www.aicoo.io/api/v1/os/share" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${AICOO_API_KEY:-$PULSE_API_KEY}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{