T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:47- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Packages and Mutable Container Image
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:24-29;README.md:19-23;README.md:47-60
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through unpinned external artifacts
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
SKILL.md:24-29:bash ### 1. Install the Skill ```bash npx clawhub install woclawtext `README.md:19-23`: ```bash ## Quick Start ```bash npx clawhub install woclawtext `README.md:47-60`: ```bash Deploy your own Hub: ```bash docker run -d \ --name woclaw-hub \ -p 8082:8082 -p 8083:8083 \ -e AUTH_TOKEN=your-token \ xingp14/woclaw-hub:latestOr via Node.js:
bash npm install -g xingp14-woclaw WOCLAW_AUTH_TOKEN=your-token woclaw hubtext ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions retrieve and execute third-party artifacts without pinning immutable versions or integrity hashes: - `npx clawhub install woclaw` does not identify a reviewed, exact Skill version. - `npm install -g xingp14-woclaw` installs the registry-selected package version globally. - `xingp14/woclaw-hub:latest` is a mutable container tag whose content can change after this audit. Consequently, the code users execute can differ from the artifact that was reviewed. A compromised publisher account, package registry, container registry, or later malicious release could replace the effective implementation while the documented command remains unchanged. Global package installation can also expose a malicious package lifecycle script or executable to the invoking user's privileges. The audited project contains only documentation and does not include the downloaded package or container implementation. Therefore, their behavior and integrity cannot be established from this project. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the relevant package publisher, registry account, image repository, or release process. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious p ...[truncated 1220 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the Skill and npm package to exact, reviewed versions rather than relying on registry-selected releases.
- Pin the container image by immutable digest, for example:
bash docker run ... xingp14/woclaw-hub@sha256:<verified-digest> - Publish and verify cryptographic checksums, signatures, provenance attestations, or Sigstore signatures for every release.
- Avoid global npm installation where possible. Use a project-local, locked dependency with a committed lockfile.
- Review package lifecycle scripts before installation and use installation controls that disable scripts when they are unnecessary.
- Run the Hub as a non-root user with a read-only filesystem, minimal Linux capabilities, restricted network access, and no unnecessary host mounts.
- Document a tested upgrade process so version and digest changes require explicit security review.
- Add automated dependency, container, and provenance scanning to the release pipeline.
