Back to skill

Security audit

travel-visa

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent travel-visa helper, but it asks users to install a mutable third-party CLI globally and to surface unvalidated provider links in responses.

Review this before installing. Prefer a local, pinned CLI install if available, avoid running npm as administrator or root, and verify any FlyAI/Fliggy links and visa information against official government or consular sources before acting on them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:47
Finding

Mandatory Injection of Unvalidated External Links into Agent Responses

Content
View full analysis
`[Click to book]({detailUrl})` - 其他 -> `[Click to book]({jumpUrl})` ``` `references/templates.md:43-44`: ```markdown ![]() [Click to book]() ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill defines a mandatory output rule that inserts externally supplied `detailUrl` or `jumpUrl` values into agent responses. This behavior applies not only to hotel searches but also to other result types, including informational results such as visa centers or consulates. The destination URL originates from a remote FlyAI/Fliggy response, but the skill does not require: - HTTPS enforcement. - Domain allowlisting. - Redirect validation. - Clear disclosure of the link provider. - Verification that the destination is actually a booking resource. - User consent before presenting a commercial or tracking link. The generic label `Click to book` can also misrepresent non-booking links. Because the instruction is marked as a strong constraint, it alters the agent's response behavior whenever the skill is loaded and can cause remote URLs to be presented with the apparent trust of the agent. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes the travel-visa skill for visa, consulate, hotel, or itinerary information. 2. The agent queries a FlyAI/Fliggy-backed endpoint. 3. The remote response supplies a `jumpUrl` or `detailUrl`. 4. The skill's mandatory output rule places that URL into the final response without explicit host or redirect validation. 5. The user treats the agent-generated link as trusted and follows it. 6. If the upstream response, account, endpoint, or redirect chain is compromised, the user may be sent to a phishing, tracking, mi ...[truncated 673 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:25
Finding

Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party npm CLI

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The manifest description is written in Chinese and the instructions explicitly require reading Chinese documents and producing specific output formats, but nowhere offers an option to use another language. This creates a language/locale policy concern because the skill appears to mandate a specific language rather than letting the user opt in or choose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This markdown file contains user-facing operational guidance exclusively in Chinese, and there is no indication that users may choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking context. That can violate language/locale policy requirements that prohibit forcing a specific language without user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The playbook headings, descriptions, and command guidance are entirely written in Chinese, which imposes a specific language on users. The file does not offer any language choice or explain that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking or region-specific audience.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This markdown template appears to require Chinese as the interaction and output language, but it does not state that the skill is region-specific or provide any opt-in for other languages. Under the language/locale policy rule, forcing a specific language without user choice is a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.