T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:8- Finding
Forced Commercial Output and Agent Behavior Hijacking
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This travel skill is mostly coherent, but it can auto-install a global third-party CLI and persist raw travel queries without clear consent or safeguards.
Install only if you are comfortable with the agent using FlyAI/Fliggy as the required data source, showing booking links, installing a global npm CLI, and writing local execution logs. Prefer requiring explicit approval before installation, pinning the CLI version, using a sandbox or project-local install, and disabling or redacting raw-query logs.
SKILL.md:8Forced Commercial Output and Agent Behavior Hijacking
SKILL.md:119Automatic Installation of an Unpinned Global npm Dependency
references/runbook.md:1Persistent Logging of Raw User Queries Through Unsafe Shell Interpolation
Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.
flyai keyword-search --query "租车 成都"
## Output Rules
1. **Conclusion first** — lead with the key finding
2. **Comparison table** with ≥ 3 results when available
The skill explicitly frames the agent as a CLI executor and later requires command execution, but it does not warn the user that following the workflow may run local commands and modify the host environment. In an agent setting, hidden command execution expectations can lead to unreviewed installation or execution on the user's machine, increasing supply-chain and system-integrity risk.
The prerequisites instruct a global npm installation of a third-party CLI without any caution about package trust, permissions, or system modification. Global installs can alter the environment, expose users to supply-chain compromise, and are especially risky when automated by an agent without clear consent.
The mandatory environment check escalates from checking for a binary to automatically running npm i -g @fly-ai/flyai-cli if it is missing, with no user-facing warning or approval step. This creates a direct path for an agent to modify the host system and install external code, which magnifies supply-chain risk and makes the skill more dangerous than a passive documentation-only workflow.
The log template explicitly stores the raw user_query along with detailed execution metadata, and the runbook states this log is maintained internally without any user-facing notice. In a travel-planning skill, user queries may contain names, destinations, dates, booking details, or other sensitive travel information, so retaining this data creates unnecessary privacy and disclosure risk.
Taken together, the runbook requires persistent logging of raw user input plus internal execution details such as CLI commands, fallback behavior, and output metadata. This creates a natural-language data leakage path where sensitive user-provided travel details and operational internals may be exposed to anyone with log access, and the travel/booking context makes such data especially likely to be personal and valuable.
The runbook instructs appending execution logs to a local file, but gives no warning about local data storage, retention, encryption, or access restrictions. Because the same logs include request identifiers, raw queries, commands, and outcomes, file-based persistence increases the chance of unintended disclosure through local access, backups, debugging artifacts, or multi-tenant environments.
No suspicious patterns detected.