T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:10- Finding
Forced Commercial CLI and Output Hijacking
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This travel skill is mostly coherent, but it should be reviewed because it mandates an unpinned global CLI install and can persist raw travel queries in a local log.
Review before installing. Only use this skill if you are comfortable with FlyAI/Fliggy being the exclusive provider, with booking links and branding in results, and with a global npm CLI install. Avoid entering sensitive personal itinerary details unless logging is disabled or sanitized, and prefer manually installing a pinned, reviewed CLI version in an isolated environment.
SKILL.md:10Forced Commercial CLI and Output Hijacking
SKILL.md:35Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party npm Package
references/runbook.md:7Plaintext Persistence of Raw User Queries and Execution Metadata
Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.
flyai keyword-search --query "包车一日游 杭州"
## Output Rules
1. **Conclusion first** — lead with the key finding
2. **Comparison table** with ≥ 3 results when available
The skill explicitly directs the agent to install a third-party CLI globally via npm if it is missing, which modifies the host environment and executes untrusted package code without prior user approval. In an agent setting, this creates a supply-chain and system-integrity risk because package install scripts may run automatically and the global install changes persist beyond the task.
The prerequisites section instructs use of a global npm install without warning that it will alter the system and execute code from a third-party package source. Even though presented as setup documentation, agent frameworks may treat such instructions operationally, leading to unauthorized environment changes.
The environment check workflow goes beyond documentation and tells the agent to detect a missing binary, install a third-party CLI, and then execute it automatically. This is more dangerous because it combines autonomous package installation with immediate execution, increasing exposure to malicious packages, install hooks, and unintended system changes without user awareness.
The runbook explicitly records raw user queries and detailed command execution data in an internal log while stating the log is not shown to users. This creates a privacy and data-handling risk because travel-related queries may contain sensitive personal, itinerary, or booking information, and users are given no notice, minimization, or retention controls.
The runbook directs retention of raw user input in an internal execution log and pairs it with step-by-step operational details, creating a consolidated record of potentially sensitive travel requests and system actions. In this skill context, users may provide names, destinations, dates, visa details, booking preferences, or other personal travel data, making persistent storage more dangerous than in a low-sensitivity domain.
The append operation persists execution logs to a local file without any safeguards around sensitive contents, file permissions, rotation, or retention. If the log contains raw queries, commands, booking details, or recovery actions, local persistence increases exposure to unauthorized access, accidental disclosure, and long-term retention of personal data.
No suspicious patterns detected.