T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:10- Finding
Forced Commercial Output and Agent Behavior Hijacking
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This travel skill is mostly coherent, but it automatically installs an unpinned global CLI package and can persist raw user travel queries without consent or retention controls.
Review carefully before installing. Only use this skill if you are comfortable installing the flyai CLI globally and receiving provider-filtered results with booking links. Avoid entering passport, payment, account, or other sensitive travel details unless logging is disabled or clearly controlled.
SKILL.md:10Forced Commercial Output and Agent Behavior Hijacking
SKILL.md:45Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party npm Package
references/runbook.md:5Unsafe Persistent Logging of Raw User Queries
Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.
flyai search-poi --city-name "Kyoto" --keyword "红叶"
## Output Rules
1. **Conclusion first** — lead with the key finding
2. **Comparison table** with ≥ 3 results when available
The manifest description says the skill also supports flight booking, hotel reservation, train tickets, attraction tickets, itinerary planning, visa info, travel insurance, car rental, and more. In this file, the only concrete executable commands shown are flyai search-poi queries for foliage-related POIs, and no actual workflows or parameters for the broader travel services are defined here.
The skill instructs the agent to automatically install a global npm package (npm i -g @fly-ai/flyai-cli) as part of normal execution, without explicit user consent or trust verification. In an agent context, this expands the attack surface by allowing unreviewed code execution and system modification, which is especially risky because package installation scripts can execute arbitrary code.
The trigger phrase "autumn leaves in China" is broad enough to match many ordinary travel-planning requests, which can cause this playbook to activate unintentionally. Because the playbook issues a destination-specific POI search based on a generic seasonal query, users may receive tool-driven behavior or narrowed results they did not explicitly request.
The trigger phrase "ginkgo trees" is highly generic and likely to overlap with casual questions about trees, botany, photography, or local landmarks. In a travel skill that can perform downstream booking and search actions, such unintended activation increases the risk of irrelevant tool use and misrouting the user's request into a travel workflow.
The runbook explicitly captures raw user input in user_query and defines a persistence mechanism to append execution logs to a local file, but provides no minimization, redaction, retention, or consent controls. In a travel skill, users may submit passport details, visa data, contact information, booking preferences, or other sensitive travel-related content, so storing raw prompts materially increases privacy and data leakage risk.
The schema requires detailed logging of commands, fallbacks, output characteristics, and risk flags, and the persistence example writes the full generated log to .flyai-execution-log.json. This creates a natural-language data exposure path because operational logs can accumulate sensitive user content and booking-related context, and may later be accessed by other processes, operators, or downstream tooling without the user's awareness.
The section is under 'Execute CLI Commands' and presents 'Playbook A: Kyoto Autumn' as an executable workflow, but the fenced block contains prose ('Flight to Japan (Nov) + Kyoto hotel + maple temple POIs') instead of a real command. This contradicts the file's repeated instruction that all data must come from actual flyai CLI execution and that parameters must not be invented.
No suspicious patterns detected.