T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:17- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party CLI Installation Enables Supply-Chain Compromise
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:17-33; related instruction atCONTRIBUTING.md:19-22
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and mutable third-party dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
SKILL.md:17-33:bash ### npm recommended ```bash npm install -g agent-browser agent-browser install agent-browser install --with-depsFrom Source
bash git clone https://github.com/vercel-labs/agent-browser cd agent-browser pnpm install pnpm build agent-browser installtext `CONTRIBUTING.md:19-22`: ```bash 1. Install the latest version ```bash npm install -g agent-browser@latest ```Technical Analysis
The installation instructions execute mutable third-party content without pinning an npm package version, Git commit, dependency lockfile state, or integrity hash. The
@latestinstruction explicitly selects whichever release is current at installation time. Likewise, cloning the repository without checking out a reviewed commit causes the build to consume the current default branch.Global npm installation can execute package lifecycle scripts with the installing user's privileges. The source-build path also executes dependency lifecycle scripts through
pnpm installand subsequently runs upstream build and installation logic. Although the named npm package and GitHub repository are consistent with the documented upstream project and there is no evidence of typosquatting in the audited files, these mutable installation paths prevent reproducible verification.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream npm publishing account, repository, dependency chain, or release process.
- The attacker publishes a malicious version under the legitimate package name or adds malicious installation/build logic to the repository's default branch.
- A user follows the documented
npm install -g agent-browser, `npm install -g agent- ...[truncated 954 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
agent-browserto a reviewed, exact version instead of using an implicit current release or@latest. - Pin source installation to a full Git commit hash and verify that commit against a trusted signed release or tag.
- Retain and enforce a reviewed lockfile for source builds, using immutable/frozen-lockfile installation options.
- Verify package integrity through registry integrity metadata, checksums, signed provenance, or Sigstore attestations where available.
- Remove
npm install -g agent-browser@latestfrom troubleshooting guidance. - Prefer a project-local or isolated installation over a global installation to reduce the modification scope.
- Document that users should not run package installation with administrator or root privileges.
- Review lifecycle scripts and transitive dependency changes before upgrading the pinned version.
- Pin
