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Security audit

EverySearch - Web, News, Forum and Academic Search

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

EverySearch provides a coherent web-search integration with disclosed external requests, API-key setup, and usage charges.

Install if you accept sending search queries and requested URLs to EveryInfra and paying applicable charges. Avoid confidential queries and private or token-bearing URLs: the provider says it retains request parameters. Use a dedicated key restricted to search, keep it in secret settings, and review enabled MCP tools. [Privacy policy](https://everyinfra.com/en/privacy)

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

External retrieval instructions omit a privacy warning about transmitting queries and URLs to EveryInfra.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to perform searches, claim checks, and URL retrieval through EveryInfra, which sends task-derived queries or URLs to a third-party service. Although setup documents the remote endpoint, the skill does not disclose this data sharing or warn against including sensitive user information in requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

md
## Setup in OpenClaw

1. Create an API key at https://everyinfra.com/en/docs?utm_source=clawhub&utm_medium=directory&utm_campaign=listing_2026q4&utm_content=everysearch and export it as `EVERYINFRA_API_KEY`. Capability discovery needs no key; paid calls do.
2. Add the remote MCP server once: `openclaw mcp add everyinfra --url https://api.everyinfra.com/mcp --transport streamable-http`, then set its `Authorization: Bearer` header to the key in Settings -> MCP (keep the key out of config literals). Check it with `openclaw mcp doctor everyinfra --probe`.
3. The live MCP tool list is the runtime truth. EveryInfra failed or empty calls are reported in the response `billing` block; read it instead of assuming.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.