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Security audit

EveryData - TikTok, Instagram, Amazon and 90 Platforms

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s data retrieval and AI processing fit its stated purpose, with expected external-service privacy and usage costs.

Use a key limited to the products you need and review call prices. EveryAI processes submitted records externally; exclude sensitive information unless authorized. Review the provider’s [privacy policy](https://everyinfra.com/en/privacy), which states that request parameters and service logs are retained.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

The skill instructs agents to process collected records with EveryAI without warning that those records are sent to an external AI service.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill directs agents to send collected records to EveryAI for cleanup or summarization without explicitly disclosing this additional AI-processing step or requiring authorization for sensitive records. Collected profiles, comments, and reviews may contain personal information, so this instruction can cause unnecessary disclosure or processing beyond the user's intended retrieval task. Use of the same provider and the stated redacted-data contract reduce concern but do not establish that records are non-sensitive or authorized for AI processing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

md
## Setup in OpenClaw

1. Create an API key at https://everyinfra.com/en/docs?utm_source=clawhub&utm_medium=directory&utm_campaign=listing_2026q4&utm_content=everydata and export it as `EVERYINFRA_API_KEY`. Capability discovery needs no key; paid calls do.
2. Add the remote MCP server once: `openclaw mcp add everyinfra --url https://api.everyinfra.com/mcp --transport streamable-http`, then set its `Authorization: Bearer` header to the key in Settings -> MCP (keep the key out of config literals). Check it with `openclaw mcp doctor everyinfra --probe`.
3. The live MCP tool list is the runtime truth. EveryInfra failed or empty calls are reported in the response `billing` block; read it instead of assuming.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.